マイケル・ポランニー『暗黙知の次元』について

以下の文章は、マイケル・ポランニー『暗黙知の次元』の読書会のために用意したレジュメである。担当箇所はpp.79-91。頁番号は、特に断りのない限り、全て高橋勇男訳（ちくま学芸文庫）のもの。

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【背景―暗黙知的構造の拡張】

マイケル・ポランニーの「暗黙知」(tacit knowing; tacit knowledge) [1]と言えば、「言葉に表せない・明示化できない知識」だとよく説明される。もちろんこれは全く正しい。実際、本書の第一章は専ら暗黙知のこの側面の考察に割かれている。しかしそれは他方で暗黙知の一側面、認識論におけるその顕現に過ぎない。暗黙知概念そのものの射程はもっと広い。というのも、『暗黙知の次元』におけるポランニーの企ては、暗黙知的構造の及ぶ範囲を人間の認識・知覚から世界そのものへと広げることだからである。第一章では、人間の認識・知覚の暗黙知的構造が考察の対象であった。そこでポランニーは「内在化」(interiorization)、ないし「身体化」(in-dwelling)という概念を提示し、ある事物を近位項として機能させることによって、我々が自らの身体を世界の方へと開いていく様子を描いていた。この延長線上に第二章の存在論の議論がある。ここでポランニーは、職人の技を理解するという事例を挙げ、次の仮定を置く：「他のすべての暗黙知の事例においても、包括する行為の構造と、その行為の対象たる包括的存在の構造は、一致する」（p.63; 原文傍点）。この仮定は、暗黙知概念を認識・知覚の領域から存在論の領域へ拡張する上で、議論の鍵となるアイデアであるように思われるものの、正直言って非常に理解しづらい。具体的に言えば、ポランニーは一体どのような世界観に基づいてこのような仮定を置いているのか、いまいちピンと来ないのである。この問題は後で取り上げることにして、とりあえず長い前置きを終えて自分の担当箇所に移りたい。

【境界制御の原理】

第二章の前半でポランニーは、すべての生命現象を物理学と化学の法則によって説明しようとする生物学者を批判するという論脈で、「境界制御の原理」(the principle of marginal control)という概念を提示していた。システムの下位レベルの諸要素の振る舞いに境界条件を付与することによって、上位レベルに一定のパターンが出現するが、こうした境界条件の付与を「境界制御」と呼んでいるのである。そしてポランニーの主要論点は、具体的な境界制御の決め方、すなわち上位レベルの組織化原理は、下位レベルからは論理的に独立であり、したがって後者だけからは出現しえない、ということである(pp.79-80)。ポランニーは、下位レベルに存在しない組織化原理が上位レベルで出現するこうした過程を「創発」(emergence)と呼び、非生命からの生命の誕生にそのパラダイムを見ているのである(pp.78-79)。

【進化論の神学的書き換え】

アンリ・ベルクソンの「エラン・ヴィタール」（生命の跳躍）とも共鳴するこうした創発概念に基づき、ポランニーは、進化論の大胆な書き換えに着手する(p.82)。彼によれば、現行の進化論が前提とする自然淘汰説は、新種の個体群の出現は説明できても、新種の個体の出現を説明できない(p.83)。ある一個の人間の発生の系譜を太古の原形質まで遡って考えたとき、その発生の因果連鎖には、自然淘汰に欠かせない「逆境」(adversity)の要素が存在しない、と言うのである。議論が簡潔過ぎて決して分かりやすいとは言えないが、少なくともポランニーが考えている進化が、ランダムな突然変異と淘汰の積み重ねではないことは明らかであろう。彼からすれば、生物学の専門家たちが想定するこうした進化概念では、新奇性や自律性の出現を説明できないのである。ポランニーにとって進化とはむしろ、科学活動におけるのと全く同じような「発見」のプロセスなのである(pp.85-86)。これはおそらく、メタファーでも単なる擬人化でもなく、文字通り、意味獲得に関わる暗黙知的構造が、生命が誕生する原初の創発から、人間の認識・知覚に至るまで、貫いて伏在しているということなのだろう（ところでこの同一視こそが、私が上で挙げた問題に繋がる）。ここで、下位レベルの組織化原理が未決定のままに開いている境界条件を埋めるという跳躍的作用が、近位項から遠位項に向かって意味を見出す認識の運動に対応するのだろう（とはいえこの対応関係も本書の記述ではあまり明確とは言えない）。そして太古の原形質に始まるこの宇宙論スケールの進化のプロセスの頂点に位置するのが人間の知能、とりわけその道徳感覚である(p.86, pp.89-90)。これは露骨なほど明らかにキリスト教的な立場である。[2] 少々長くなるが、この点について参考になるので、ポランニーの主著『個人的知識』(Personal Knowledge)の結びの言葉を引いておこう：

われわれの知る限り、人間に体現されている宇宙の微小な諸断片は、可視的世界における思考と責任の唯一の中心である。もしそれが真実ならば、人間の心の出現は、いまのところ世界の覚醒の究極的な段階であり、それに先んじたすべての物事、生きることと信ずることのリスクを引き受けた無数の中心の格闘は、すべて、さまざまに異なる経路をとりながらも、現在、われわれがここまで達成している目標を追求してきたように思われる。それらは、すべてわれわれの血族である。というのは、これらすべての中心、すなわち、われわれ自身の存在をもたらし、その多くがすでに消滅した異なる経路を生み出した、無数に多くの他の中心の存在をもたらした、すべての中心は、究極的な解放に向かっての同一の努力に従事しているように見えるからである。われわれは、そこで、ひとつの宇宙の場を、短命で限定され危険に満ちた機会を各中心に与えて、それらが考えもおよばない完成に向かって前進するようにと命じた、ひとつの宇宙の場を思い浮かべてもよいかもしれない。そして、それはまた、——私はそう信ずるが——キリスト教徒が神を礼拝するときの在り方でもあるのだ。[3]

 
非キリスト教徒の近代人にとって、このような記述を理解するのは容易ではないだろうし、共感することはほぼ不可能だろう。しかし、この壮大な形而上学が荒唐無稽に見えるとすれば、それは偏に、我々近代人が人間と自然を切り離して考える習慣に囚われているからだ、とポランニーなら言うかもしれない。そしてこの点が再び、私が冒頭に挙げた問題に繋がる。すなわち、いかなる世界観に基づいてポランニーは、認識論・知覚論の次元における暗黙知と、存在論の次元における創発とを同一視しているのか、という問題である。

 【主体と客体の融即】

暗黙知と創発を巡るポランニーの議論を初めて読んだとき、私には非常に奇妙に感じられた（今読み返してもやはり奇妙である）。その理由は、彼が主体と客体の区別に無頓着であるからだと思われる。暗黙知を論じているのだから、当然、その「知」を所有しているのは誰なのか、という主体の問題が出てくる。人間の認識・知覚を論じている限り、主体性の在処ははっきりしている。すなわち個人である。しかし議論が創発に移り、暗黙知と創発が同一視された途端に、語られているのは誰の暗黙知なのか、訳が分からなくなる。私は以前、ポランニーを一種の観念論者として解釈していた。つまり、個人が所有する暗黙知の及ぶ範囲が、身体から、例えば歩き慣れた道といった境界事例を通して、究極的には世界全体とぴったり一致する、といったような描像である。しかしこのような解釈ではポランニーの記述を整合的に解釈することが難しいことに気付いた（例えば、生命誕生の瞬間には当然、それを認識する人間主体が存在しなかった）。そこで辿り着いたのが、ポランニーにとってはあらゆる生命（そして非生命？）が、視点や状況に応じて主体であったり客体であったりする、という一種の汎心論的見方である。暗黙知と創発の具体的な対応関係は相変わらず曖昧であるものの、少なくともこの解釈にはシンプルさの利点があるように思うが、如何だろう。ところで本節のタイトルに挙げた「融即」という言葉は、ポランニーに影響を与えたらしいフランスの社会哲学者・文化人類学者レヴィ＝ブリュールに由来する。未開部族の観察から彼は、個人が自らの感情や動機を外界の事物と共感的に同一視する作用に注目し、これを「融即」(participation)と名付けたのである。[4] こうした関連から、ポランニーの暗黙知と創発の同一視が含意する主体と客体の問題を考えてみるのも興味深いかもしれない。

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[1] tacit knowingもtacit knowledgeもともに「暗黙知」と訳されるため、邦訳ではこの区別が難しくなる。ポランニーが使うのは専らtacit knowingの方であるが、このことから、彼の暗黙知概念は動名詞であるから「知識」のことではない、と結論するのは早計である（実際このような主張をしばしば目にする）。というのも『暗黙知の次元』の冒頭で彼は次のように断っているからである：「私は“知る”(knowing)という言葉を常に、実践的な知識と理論的な知識(practical and theoretical knowledge)の両方を包含するものとして使う」（原著p.7; 高橋訳では文意が伝わりづらくなっているので、敢えて拙訳を用いた）。

[2] ポランニーはユダヤ人の家庭に生まれているものの、熱心なキリスト教徒である。1919年にはカトリックの洗礼を受けており、後年プロテスタントの立場に傾倒していったようである（William T. Scottによるポランニーの伝記Michael Polanyi: Scientist and Philosopherを参照）。また、『個人的知識』は英語圏ではキリスト教神学者への影響が絶大であり、ポランニー体系の研究や解説の多くがキリスト教神学の論脈においてなされているそうである。

[3] マイケル・ポランニー『個人的知識』（長尾史郎訳，ハーベスト社，1995年）。今手元に本がないので頁番号は不明。

[4] リュシアン・レヴィ＝ブリュール『未開社会の思惟』（山田吉彦訳，岩波文庫，1991年）

【メモ】 The American Pragmatists (Cheryl Misak)

Cheryl Misak (2013) The American Pragmatists, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

【第一章　初期アメリカ思想におけるプラグマティズム的諸テーマ】

The fact that we can be surprised suggests that experience is not illusory and the world is not constructed entirely by us. Although we may color the universe, there is something that we are coloring. (p.12) cf. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Collected Works 3: 48

【第二章　Chauncey Wright】

But whatever be the origin of the theories of science, Whether from a systematic examination of empirical facts by conscious induction, or from the natural biases of the mind, the so-called intuitions of reason, what seems probable without a distinct survey of our experiences—whatever the origin, real or ideal, the value of these theories can only be tested ... by an appeal to sensible experience, by deductions from them of consequences which we can confirm by the undoubted testimony of the senses. (Chauncey Wright, Philosophical Discussions p.46)

This is a signal difference between pragmatism and British empiricism. Pramatism is not primarily a view about the sources or origins of belief, but a view of what tests a belief must pass once we have it. It is a view about what it is for a belief to count as non-spurious, genuine, or legitimate. (pp.17-18)

A belief can have consequences for the believer—it can make me feel better, it can influence my train of thought, I can desire it to be true, etc. But that is not the kind of consequence Wright thinks salient. A belief must have consequences not only for the believer, but for the world. The importance of this distinction will amplify as we march through the history of pragmatism. (pp.24-25)

【第三章　Charles Sanders Peirce】

[W]hen Paul Carus associated him [Peirce] with Hume in an article published in The Monist titled "Mr. Charles S. Peirce's Onslaught on the Doctrine of Necessity," Peirce resisted the comparison (Collected Papers 6.605). It is interesting, though, that it was not the empiricism he objected to. It was the nominalist metaphysical underpinnings of it. (p.28)

He [Peirce] did not want to define truth as that which satisfies our aims in inquiry. A dispute about definition, he says, is usually a "profitless discussion" (CP 8. 100). ... The pragmatist is merely getting one fix on the idea of truth. (p.36)

[For Peirce,] a true belief is such that it would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could into the matter. A true belief is such that, no matter how much further we were to investigate and  debate, that belief would not be overturned by recalcitrant experience and argument. Peirce says: "if Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any actual satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction that would ultimately be found if the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and indefeasible issue" (Collected Papers 5.569; 6.485). (p.37)

We have in our various inquiries and deliberations a multiplicity of aims—empirical adequacy, coherence with other beliefs, simplicity, explanatory power, getting a reliable guide to action, fruitfulness for other research, greater understanding of others, living peacefully with others, increased maturity, and the like. When we say that we aim at the truth, what we mean is that, were a belief really to satisfy all of our local aims in inquiry, then that belief would be true. There is nothing over and above the fulfillment of those aims, nothing metaphysical, to which we aspire. Truth is not some transcendental, mystical thing and we do not aim at it for its own sake. (p.37)

The emotion of surprise is "merely the instinctive indication of the logical situation. It is evolution (φύσις) that has provided us with the emotion" (CP 7.190) (p.39)
→　パースの言う「経験の強制力」は単なる心理的、情緒的な衝動ではない。後者はあくまで進化の産物。（では一体何か？）

What we can say, he [Peirce] thinks, is that the fact that we have only our interpretations of what we experience does not throw us into a sea of arbitrary interpretations, where there is no connection to what is real. Our perceptual judgments, Peirce argues, are indices of our percepts—of the actual clash between us and the world. (p.40)

Peirce ... thinks that we can know something of the world as it exists independently of us—we can know that it is there and that it constrains us. Peirce turns to the idea that we can be mistaken in order to show that there is an objective truth and that reality that [sic] goes beyond what you or I or any collection of people happen to think: "The experience of ignorance, or of error, which we have, and which we gain by means of correcting our errors, or enlarging our knowledge, does enable us to experience and conceive something which is independent of our own limited views" (CP 7.345). (p.40)

This forceful element [of experiential judgements] is our link with a reality, something that goes beyond us: "Now the 'hardness' of fact lies in the insistency of the percept, its entirely irrational insistency, —the element of Secondness in it. That is a very important factor of reality" (CP 7.659). (p.41)

Peirce thinks that the theory of evolution tells us, indeed, that our capacities have been selected for survival, but that, nonetheless, we aim at getting beliefs not merely with survival benefits, but beliefs that are independent of human capacities and contexts of inquiry. (p.41n)

The seemingly unsolvable problem of induction disintegrates once we acknowledge that regularities abound, but only some of them want explanations. Only unexpected or surprising regularities make a demand on us to make an inference to the best explanation. (p.49)
→　驚きを伴わない規則性は習慣の領域に沈滞している。

"The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. ... We must therefore be guided by the rule of hope" (CP 1.405)

【第四章　William James】

He [James] notes with approval that Jonathan Edwards thought that it was by the fruits not the roots that we must test our beliefs (The Varieties of Religious Experience p.25). (p.70)

【第五章　Holmes、Royce、Schiller】

[For Holmes, law] is an enterprise of inquiry, or "successive approximation," that starts from precedent and then is driven by experience, conflict, and unanticipated problems. (p.78)

Peirce is adamant, with Royce, that we have to preserve a gap in which error can live. (p.84)
→　パースにおいては、outward clashがこの間隙を保証する。

【第七章　John Dewey】

[For Dewey] A belief has to satisfy the inquirer's needs and it has to satisfy the situation. It is bound to the personal or the psychological but it also has to meet what the situation demands of it. (p.112)

"The way in which men do 'think' denotes ... simply the ways in which men at a given time carry on their inquiries. So far as it is used to register a difference from the ways in which they ought to think, it denotes a difference like that between good and bad farming or good and bad medical practice. Men think in ways they should not when they follow methods of inquiry that experience of past inquiries shows are not competent to reach the intended end of the inquiries in question" (The Later Works 12.107)
 →　パースが規範性を未来の探求に求めるのに対して、デューイは過去にそれを見出す。

It is certainly the case that those pragmatists who want to talk about the world and its constraints need to work hard to show how there is some space between their view and that of their realist opponents. We have seen that Peirce opens us that gap by arguing that we have no cognitive access to the world of independent objects—it is only by abstracting the forceful element from experience that we can get an inkling that the world is there. Dewey, on the other hand, needs to work to say why his view remains suflficiently far away from his idealist opponents who have a hard time making sense of the ideas of improvement, mistakes, and standards. (p.119)

"It is the situation that has these traits [vagueness and confusion]. We are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful" (The Later Works 12.109)

"The question naturally arises how Professor Dewey comes to have a metaphysics. How does he know that specificity, interaction, change, characterize all existence, and that these distinctions are not merely logical, made for purposes of getting along in this world, but characters of an independent existence? Why does he impute the features presented in human experience to a nature embracing, but containing more than, that experience?" (Ernest Nagel, "Can Logic be Divorced From Ontology?" p.707)

Nagel thinks that we need to distinguish "symbols from the subject-matter to which they point." We have seen that Peirce agrees, although his way of distinguishing these two things is as minimal as possible—all we can do is point or gesture at the subject matter. (p.121)

"Mr. Russell proceeds first by converting a doubtful situation into a personal doubt, although the difference between the two things is repeatedly pointed out by me. I have even repeatedly stated that a personal doubt is pathological unless it is a reflection of a situation which is problematic. Then by changing doubt into private discomfort, truth is identified with removal of this discomfort. The only desire that enters, according to my view, is desire to resolve as honestly and impartially as possible the problem involved in the situation. 'Satisfaction' is satisfaction of the conditions prescribed by the problem. Personal satisfaction may enter in as it arises when any job is well done according to the requirements of the job itself; but it does not enter in any way into the determination of validity, because, on the contrary, it is determined by that validity" (The Later Works 14.156)

Dewey is set against the "intellectualist" account of truth, on which truth is "antecedent to any process of verification" (The Middle Works 4.76).

Another way of putting this disagreement between Peirce and Dewey is to ask whether truth is a static phenomenon. Both reject the idea that truth is static in the sense that our beliefs either mirror the world of the Absolute (and are hence true) or fail to do so (and are hence false). But Peirce thinks that truth is static in the sense that a belief either would or would not survive the rigors of inquiry. Again, Dewey usually stays away from this thought. His interest ends with beliefs that show themselves to resolve a particular, local problem. (p.127)

 【第八章　Mead、Santayana】

He [Santayana] thinks that "in their hearts and lives," Americans are all pragmatists: "Their real philosophy is the philosophy of enterprise." They are optimists who "turn their scorn of useless thought into a glad denial of its existence" ("Apologia Pro Mente Sua" p.248-249 in Paul Schilpp, The Philosophy of George Santayana). He did not want to be associated with the American "business intellect" way of thinking. He preferred the intellectual company of Spinoza and the ancient Greeks. (p.144)

He alludes to the two shortcomings in Dewey's philosophy—the awkward metaphysics and the inability to adjudicate—in one harsh sentence. Dewey remains an idealist with Emerson, Schelling, and Hegel: "romantic, transcendental, piously receiving as absolute the inspiration dominating moral life in their day and country" ("Dewey's Naturalist Metaphysics" p.680). (pp.144-145)

"Living when human faith is again in a state of dissolution, I have imitated the Greek sceptics in calling doubtful everything that, in spite of common sense, any one can possibly doubt. But since life and even discussion forces me to break away from a complete scepticism, I have determined not to do so surreptitiously nor at random, ignominiously taking cover now behind one prejudice and now behind another. Instead I have frankly taken nature by the hand, accepting as a rule in my farthest speculations the animal faith I live by from day to day." (Scepticism and Animal Faith p.308)

Philosophy must begin in the middle of things. We assume that many of our beliefs are true and we need not be pushed into trying to prove those beliefs or show that they are certainly or infallibly true. We do not need Cartesian requirements for certainty. (p.147)

"I stand in philosophy exactly where I stand in daily life ; I should not be honest otherwise." (Scepticism and Animal Faith p.vi)

"You cannot prove realism to a complete sceptic or idealist; but you can show an honest man that he is not a complete sceptic or idealist, but a realist at heart" ("Three Proofs of Realism" in Essays in Critical Realism p.184)

Santayana and Peirce struggle mightily to articulate the good side of this thought [James's idea of the Will to Believe]. They both argue that we must accept the bulk of our beliefs, but always keep them open to recalcitrant experience and never believe them on grounds extraneous to facts and reasons. This last point is important. Like Peirce, when Santayana uses the word "faith," he does not mean to mark something that is unbacked by reasons. He says that instead of using "so brutal a term as animal faith," he might have used "cognitive instinct, empirical confidence, even practical reason" ("Apologia Pro Mente Sua" p.586). Each of these alternatives makes it clear that there is something normative or non-arbitrary in what we need to assume. (p.148)

"Why does belief that you can jump a ditch help you to jump it? Because it is a symptom of the fact that you could jump it, that your legs were fit and that the ditch was two yards wide and not twenty. A rapid and just appreciation of these facts has iven you your confidence, or at least has made it reasonable, manly, and prophetic; otherwise you would have been a fool and got a ducking for it." ("The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy" in The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy and Character and Opinion in the United States p.61)

The encountering of "brute fact" is the "ground" for Santayana's realism ("Apologia Pro Mente Sua"p.504-505). The "experience of shock" "establishes realism"—it establishes "a world of independent existences" (Scepticism and Animal Faith p.142). Santayana does not want to be associated with the pragmatists because he thinks that a pragmatist such as Dewey is "a philosopher of the foreground" ("Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics" p.680), too content with the surface of things. (p.148)

【第十章　Clarence Irving Lewis】

With Peirce (and Kant), Lewis takes the given to be that which is not under our control—that which is independent of the mind's constructive activities. (p.183)

[For Lewis] the given is that which impinges upon us or resists our attempts to change it and thus constrains our opinions (this is the set of thoughts he shares with Peirce). There is no need to add that the given is something that has a certain structure or quality. (p.183n)

What Lewis argues is that there must be something constraining the truth and falsity of our statements and beliefs. (p.184)

For Lewis, it is experience—not logic, not conceptual truth—that is brute and compelling. (p.192)
→　ア・プリオリな真理は確かに必然的だが、それのみを受け容れるよう我々を強制するという意味で必然的ではない。そのような意味でbruteなのは経験の抗力。

"What is a priori is necessary truth not because it compels the mind's acceptance, but precisely because it does not. It is given experience, brute fact, the a posteriori element in knowledge which the mind must accept willy-nilly. The a priori represents an attitude in some sense freely taken, a stipulation of the mind itself, and a stipulation which might be made in some other way if it suited our bent or need. Such truth is necessary as opposed to contingent, not as opposed to voluntary. "("A Pragmatic Conception of Truth" p.231)

"we cannot capture the truth of experience if we have no net to catch it in" (The Mind and the World Order p.271) →　この網がア・プリオリな概念やカテゴリー。それは経験のあり方を規定するから経験から独立なのではなく、経験を規定しない（経験のbrtueな抗力に任せる）からこそ独立。また、この網は一つとは限らず、プラグマティックに選択され得る。Lewisの言葉を使えば、それは"uncompelled initiative of human thought"である。

Lewis rejects the idea, again sometimes found in James, that "new truth" replaces "old truth." When a new belief replaces an overturned belief, that should suggest that the old belief was false, not an old truth. ... An assertion always "outruns" our current evidence and best thinking. It reaches into the future and makes a prediction that the evidence and best thinking will continue to support the assertion. This, of course, is the Peircean conception of truth. (p.194)

【第十一章　Willard van Orman Quine】

[T]he insight of disquotationalism is precisely the insight of pragmatism. Both hold that when we assert that p is true, what we are doing is asserting p. The Peircean pragmatist modifies this shared thought slightly, not wanting to limp around with warranted belief. When we assert that p is true, what we are doing is asserting p and asserting that p would remain assertible. ... Both pragmatism and disquotationalism, that is, keep us focused on first-order inquiry. (p.206)

【第十三章　Richard Rorty】

Calling for a dissolution of a dualism, such as that between relativism and absolutism, does not guarantee that one succeeds in escaping the pitfalls of one or the other of the two positions. And it does not guarantee that one will not end up shuttling between the two disliked positions, depending on the particular critique to which one is responding. That is, after the call for the abandonment of a way of looking at things, one must replace the problematic mode of thinking with a new way that really does undercut the problems endemic in the old way of seeing the issue. One must replace the old dichotomy of "objective standards or no standards at all" with low-profile, non-absolutist conceptions of truth and objectivity which can guide us in our inquiries and deliberations. The pragmatist must replace the old dichotomy with distinctly pragmatist accounts of truth, objectivity, and normativity. (p.231)

Frank Ramsey also held that the pragmatist need not take "p is true" to be identified with "p is useful." For the belief p will be useful only if p. See his "Facts and Propositions." (p.232n)

As [Huw] Price puts it, pragmatists start not by asking what the analytic definition of truth is, but rather, why speakers have the notion of truth they have. They should see, he thinks, that our notion of truth does not line up neatly with warrant asertiblity, nor with disquotation. We need a stronger notion of truth than is provided by either of those notions (Naturalism Without Mirrors p.16). (p.233)

To do without truth is to silence our conversations—both our conversations with others and our internal conversations. For the very essence of the norm of truth is to give disagreement its immediate normative character. It is to make disagreement matter. Without the grit provided by the concept of truth, the wheels of argument do not engage; disagreements slide past one another. (p.234)

【第十四章　Hilary Putnam】

[For Putnam] One cannot dodge the problem of saying what truth is by replacing truth with assertibility and then not saying what assertibility is. And once one says what assertibility is, one is taken to a substantial view of truth. (p.242)