【メモ】 リバタリアニズムの人間観―ヴィルヘルム・フォン・フンボルトに見るドイツ的教養の法哲学的展開 （吉永圭）

【序章　 法哲学の厳密性を確保する法思想史方法論と現代福祉国家の問題】

「リバタリアンは人間の完全性への憧憬を持ち合わせていないため、近代法がただ強い個人を想定しているのとは異なり人間は不完全なものであり理性には限界があるということを強く意識するがゆえにあえて無色透明な人間像を採用しているのではないだろうか。つまり、リバタリアンが経済力・交渉力の格差を考慮に入れない無色透明な人間像を前提とするのは、法が法主体の多様性を把握することは不可能だという一種の諦観に基づいているからだと思われる」（橋本祐子「リバタリアニズムの法理論」p.67）
→　こうしたリバタリアニズムを「確固たる人間観なきリバタリアニズム」と呼ぶことにする

人間をあるがままの自然状態の中に放置すると想定する。すると、人間はハートが指摘したような弱さ故、自然と強制力を持った装置を熱望するのではないか。……リバタリアニズムが個人の生活への国家介入を拒否するならば、そこには何等かの目的意識から構成された人間観が必要なのではないか。あるいは確固たる人間観なきリバタリアニズムは、自らは人間のあり方から不自然でない形で最小国家論を導いたかのように装うが、実はある一定の人間観を密輸入して自己の理論を組み立てているのではないか。(p.33)

【第一章　一八世紀後半ドイツの状況】

カントにとって重要なのは立法権と行政権の分離であり、行政権は元首に委ねられる。この元首とは、カントの時代においては国王である。立法においては代議制のみが採り得る道としながらも、執行権を掌握するという形で国王の君臨を許すことから、カントが少なくとも現代的な意味での民主制を支持しなかったと結論して良い。(p.99)

「民主主義のために戦ったのちの自由主義的教義とは異なり、初期の自由主義は通常、統治の最善の形式に関して慎重に言明を避け続けた。万民の最大限の自由を保障する政体である限りは、君主制でも、貴族政でも、民主制でも良かったのである。」(Frederick C. Beiser, The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics p.xxiii)

【第三章　フンボルトの前期思想】

「人間の真の目的は、——変わりやすい傾向ではなく、いつまでも変わらない理性によって示されるものであるが——人間の持つ諸力を最高にしかも最も調和のとれた一つの全体へと陶冶すること（Bildung）である。この陶冶の為に自由は、第一の不可欠な条件である」（『国家活動の限界を決定するための試論』）

「彼［フンボルト］の自由の概念は彼の文化の概念と密接に繋がっている。彼にとって自由とは、人間の諸力の発展と、それゆえ文化の発展の不可欠の基礎を形成する、不定で多様な活動の可能性を意味する」（Reinhold Aris, History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815 p.147）。つまり、フンボルトの自由はそれ自体が価値を持つのではなく、最終的に己の諸力を文化形成に資するように導くための概念なのである。ここに政治参加への自由、といった積極的自由の概念は見られない。フンボルトの自由は、消極的自由の範囲を出ない。(p.142)

「われわれの存在に関する究極課題とは、次のようなものである。われわれの人格の中に、われわれの生前と死後を問わず、われわれが後に残す生き生きとした活動の痕跡によって、人間性（Menschheit）の概念に対して出来るだけ多くの内容を与えることである。このような課題を解決するためには、われわれの自我を世界と結び付けて、最も普遍的で、最も活発な、最も自由な相互作用を保つほかになす術はない。このことだけが、人間の認識のあらゆる部門の取り扱いを評価するための、真の尺度とならなければならない」 （『人間形成と言語』pp.68-69）

シュプランガーによる、フンボルトの人間性理念の説明：「個性」（Individualität）が諸力の「全面性」（Allseitigkeit）・「普遍性」（Universalität）を通じて自らを「全体性」（Totalität）へと形成していく。

ここで注意すべきは、フンボルトが社会集団あるいは社会関係というものを想定していたとしても、それは専ら個人という存在に対する影響に関する限りで彼の関心を引いたということだ。我々は社会集団（共同体）がフンボルトによって言及されているからといって、そこに政治的組織といった含意を読み取ることはできないのである。(pp.145-146)

フンボルトの哲学にはライプニッツの予定調和的世界観がある（個人に可能な限り自由を認めることが全体にとっても良い）。しかし社会における全体の秩序は個人の完成への努力に比べてあくまで副次的な問題。(p.147)

「後の自由主義とは異なり、彼［フンボルト］は民主制の擁護者ではなかった。彼の視野においては、容易く下層民の暴走に転じ得る民主制よりも独裁制や貴族政の方が自由を保障し得る。」
Frederick C. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism p.111)
→　モンテスキュー、ルソー、ヴィーラント、そしてカントも、小さな共同体以外で民主制が現実になることを疑っている。

フンボルトにとって民主制採用を阻む障害は「無教養な民衆」である。この層が政治を掌握すれば、暴発し、専制あるいは無秩序になるという懸念があったのだろう。これは、フランス革命直後のパリを視察したフンボルト自身の経験が教えるところであったと推測される。(p.161)
→　教養を身に付けていない者が政治に口を出せば、己の利益のために政治を利用し、他者（および自身）の陶冶を妨げることになる。

フンボルトには政治的討議で自己を練磨していくという発想は見られない。(p.162)

【第四章　フンボルト国家論における人間観の問題】

フンボルトの教育論にデヴィッド・ソーキンは、新人文主義と啓蒙主義の和解を見る。即ち、啓蒙主義、特に統治者側からの啓蒙的理念において陶冶概念は国家に有益なものであった。しかしフンボルトは陶冶を単なる道具的概念とすることを認めたくなかった。そこで、啓蒙の諸目的は間接的に、陶冶の意図されたしかし付随的な帰結として実現されるべきである。フンボルトは自由な個人になるように教育された人間の方が、市民になるように教育された人間よりも、究極的にはより良き市民となる、と主張した。「道徳的人間あるいは良き市民」の状態を作り出し国家に奉仕することが国家の究極の目的である。しかしカリキュラム上は直接そのことを目指すのではない。国家目的は、個人を無益な職業訓練に従事させることではなく、個人独自の性格を発展させるように教育することによって、最も良く達成される。(p.193)

フンボルトの作品の随所で登場する「（諸）力」の概念は、ライプニッツの「力」概念の継承。フンボルト自身の受けた教育の中で特に影響力が強かったのはライプニッツであった（ライプニッツはフンボルトにとって最初の哲学的支柱であった）。(p.208)

【第五章　フンボルトの限界とその克服の試み】

「社会の全員が常に社会的意識を持て」と命令することはリバタリアンには許されていない。我々はただ、確固たる人間観なきリバタリアニズムの議論より「緩やかな程度の政治志向性」の方が、社会的意識を有した人間が多く登場すると言い得るのみである。(p.255)

「国家の配慮というものは、全ての者が何を学ぶかではなく、全ての者が学ぶということにある」(Hans Maier, Staat, Kirche, Bildung p.72)

【終章　現代正義論へ向けて】

個々人の善の領域における幸福追求 も、その周囲を囲む領域の安定が前提となっている。秩序安定のために様々な制度（例えば、国家）が考案されるのであるが、この秩序維持に最も重要な要素はやはり人間ではないか。いくら機能的な制度を秩序維持のために導入しても、運用・利用する人間がそれに適合的な資質を持たなかったら、当該制度は秩序の維持に失敗するか、あるいは一部の人間が秩序維持目的の制度を独断的に利用し、他の人々の善を破壊するほどに暴走する恐れがある。(pp.280-281)

【メモ】 Ernst Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture (Edward Skidelsky)

【第二章　マールブルク学派】

Natorp and the young Cassirer both rebelled against this [Cohen's] mathematical dogmatism; both tried, as we shall see in the next chapter, to extend the critical method to nonscientific experience. But they nonetheless viewed such experience as a mere "first stage" in the process of objectivization, culminating eventually in physics. Their sights remained fixed on the universal, intersubjective realm of science. The Marburg school thus never fully overcame what we identified in the last chapter as the alienation of scientific reason. Although it struggled mightily against the detachment of science from morality, it could not solve—indeed, it could hardly acknowledge—the more fundamental problem of its divorce from what Husserl was later to call the Lebenswelt—the world of life. (p.45)

Radicalism—as the career of Heidegger amply illustrates—is an ambiguous virtue. Revolutions in thought have an unhappy tendency to be realized in action. Cassirer's refusal, as he put it, to hurl his ideas into empty space, his effort to relate them to those of his Kantian precursors, was fundamentally an attempt to preserve a link with the civilization that his more original contemporaries were busily dismantling. (pp.48-49)

【第三章　新しい論理学】

"The analytic function of thought, with which all these logicians appear to be exclusively concerned, has indeed a good logical claim and practical significance. But we hold fast to the conviction to which Kant has given almost classic expression: 'Where the understanding has not previously united, it cannot dissolve.' Thus ... it is synthesis that is necessarily primary for the logical understanding of knowledge, and the analysis of meaning is required only as its pure corollary." (Paul Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften p.9)

Cassirer rejected both attitudes outlined above. He did not share Carnap's view of logic as the framework of all meaningful discourse. Neither did he view it [as Heidegger did] as something to be dissolved "in the turbulence of a more original questioning." His position represents a characteristic refusal to take sides in the debate between a narrow, scientistic rationalism and a virulent irrationalism. By recasting the new logic as transcendental logic, Cassirer was able to register both its achievement and limitation. (p.56)

The historical Kant regarded the concepts of Aristotelian formal logic as constituting an independent "form of thought" which must be "schematised in intuition" in order to yield the categories of transcendental logic. In the Marburg interpretation, this relationship is reversed. Kant may have used formal logic as a "clue" to transcendental logic, explains Cassirer, but this was done not "with the aim of basing the transcendental concepts on the formal ones, but conversely, with the aim of basing the latter on the former, and in that way yielding a more profound understanding of the ultimate ground of their validity." (Kant's Life and Thought p.173) In other words, formal logic is just an abstraction from transcendental logic, with no independent philosophical significance. This revision reflects what I described in the last chapter as the Marburg school's historicization of the transcedental subject. Kant's timeless "form of thought" is dissolved into the ongoing movement of scientific objectivization, which casts off, like dead skins, the structures of pure mathematics and logic. Cassirer's logic of objective knowledge is not to be regarded as founded on symbolic logic, then, but as revealing its true foundation. (p.58)

Science is always looking forward to future consummation; it is, to borrow Cassirer's favorite phrase from Leibniz, gros de l'avenir—pregnant with the future. We must therefore reject the binary view of scientific theories as either true or false. The movement of science is not from false to true but from less comprehensive to more comprehensive. (p.62)

From the standpoint of conventional formal logic, according to which all propositions are either true or false, they [Cassirer's passages] are almost unintelligible. But from Cassirer's standpoint, it is formal logic that ultimately renders unintelligible the dynamic process of scientific discovery. (pp.62-63)

His real objection is to Cohen's more fundamental philosophical claim that the relation "is a category only insofar as it is a function [関数]." And here Russell's calculus of relations comes to his assistance. It enables Cassirer to transfer priority from the specifically mathematical notion of function to the general logical notion of relation. The former now appears as a special case of the latter, with no uniquely "categorical" significance. The possibility of categorical yet nonetheless nonmathematical relations—and thus of nonmathematical objectivization—is opened up. (p.65)

【第四章　イロニーと悲劇の間で】

"for the genius one case counts for a thousand" (Goethe)

Particularly interesting, from our point of view, is a 1932 essay by the art historian Edgar Wind, a former doctoral student of Cassirer and a member of his intellectual circle. Although personally on good terms with Cassirer, Wind was critical, from an empiricist standpoint, of his philosophy of symbolic forms. His portrait of Goethe throws some light on their differences. Wind looks askance at the very thing Cassirer so admired in the poet—namely, his irony, his capacity to treat every interpretation of reality symbolically. Where Cassirer sees only breadth and flexibility of mind, Wind discerns a subtle form of evasion. "Goethe said of himself that he viewed everything symbolically. This is an admission that in his case imagination served to transform things into images, to divest them of their substantiality, enabling him to escape the claims they might have had on him as things." It was only by renouncing reality, with its harsh, conflicting demands, that Goethe was able to achieve his celebrated inner harmony. His entire career can be seen as "a flight from life to image." It is possible that Wind formulated these remarks with his former teacher in mind. They certainly apply as well to Cassirer as they do to Goethe. (p.86)

One of the very few persons who read it [Habilitationsschrift, Experiment and Metaphysics] was the late Ernst Cassirer, and I am sorry to say it made that amiable man extremely angry. In honour of his memory I must protest against the suggestion that we held the same view about the nature of symbols. My thesis was that symbols are "real" only to the extent in which they can be embodied in an experimentum crucis whose outcome is directly observable—in his view a deplorable lapse into "empiricism." (Edgar Wind, letter to the Times Literary Supplement)

Opposition to the positivist instrumentalization of science was, as we have seen, a central part of the program of Marburg neo-Kantianism and Substance and Function. But it was only later that Cassirer began to attack positivism and instrumentalism not simply as theories in the philosophy of science but as cultural and political phenomena. Like Warburg, he viewed them as expressions of the hubris of a civilization that has forgotten or suppressed its own mythical origins, thereby opening the door to their revival. Cassirer cites as an example the degeneration of Comtean positivism into a pseudoreligion, complete with priests and temples of science. And in The Myth of the State he shows how the instrumentalization of political reason, initially undertaken in a spirit of enlightenment, eventually gives rise to the myths of modern totalitarianism. Cassirer explicitly conceived his own philosophy as an antidote to the "forgetfulness" of positivism. Like the Warburg Library, it is an attempt on the part of reason at mnemosyne or recollection. It is based on the conviction that reason can understand and feel "at home" with itself only when it has succeeded in reconstructing its own ascent from the sphere of myth. (p.98)

【第五章　象徴形式の哲学】

For all his phenomenological flirtations, Cassirer remained faithful to Cohen and Natorp's conception of philosophy as "bound to the fact of science as this constitutes itself, and therewith to the whole of human culture." Philosophy has no empire of its own; it can do no more than clarify and draw together the tendencies implicit in the arts and sciences. It is, so to speak, the self-consciousness of culture. (p.102)

[Ernst's wife] Toni Cassirer's memoir contains the following revealing story. When Cassirer's son Heinz expressed a wish to study philosophy directly after leaving school, Cassirer demurred. "It was Ernst's unshakable opinion," adds Toni, "that philosophy should never stand isolated but should rather spring spontaneously from the study of other sciences." (Toni Cassirer, Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer p.134)

The mythical origins of human culture cannot be eliminated altogether, but they can be confined to what Warburg called "the distant shadowy realm of the explicit metaphor." The myths we need are the spiritualized ones of religion and the playful ones of art. These absorb, discipline, and refine the energies that would otherwise find expression in the brutally literal myths of totalitarian politics. (p.109)

Expressive phenomena are not to be viewed, insists Cassirer, as a "projection" of inner states onto a neutral physical substratum. On the contrary, it is this "neutral substratum" that is itself derivative, a product of scientific analysis. "We arrive at the data of mere sensation—such as light or dark, warm or cold, rough or smooth—only by setting away a fundamental stratum of perception, by doing away with it, so to speak, for a definite theoretical purpose. (...) This disregard is perfectly justified from the point of view of the purely theoretical intention, the intention of building an objective order of nature and apprehending its laws; but it cannot do away with the world of expressive phenomena as such." (The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 3.37). Myth is therefore not, as commonly presented, a spiritualization of a neutral physical reality but a state prior to the very distinction between the spiritual and the physical. (...) All nature is imbued with spirit, yet spirit, by the same token, belongs entirely to nature. (p.116)

【第六章　論理実証主義】

 "I would allow as 'a priori' in the strict sense, really only the thought of the 'unity of nature,' that is to say the lawfulness of experience in general (...): but how this thought is made specific in particular principles and presuppositions—this comes to light only in the progress of scientific experience." (Ernst Cassirer, letter to Schlick)

"This transition [from one form of physical theory to another] never means that the fundamental form absolutely disappears, and another absolutely new form arises in its place. The new form must contain the answers to questions proposed within the older form; this one feature establishes a logical connection between them, and points to a common forum of judgement to which both are subjected." (Substance and Function p.268)

"For a purely descriptive ethics that remains strictly within its own boundaries, there clearly exists no ground for such a rejection [of fanaticism]. In every age, fanaticism has not merely proved its power in human affairs, it has also been advocated and preached as an ideal; and today it is lauded on many sides almost as 'the' moral ideal per se. A moral philosophy that wishes to be nothing more than a science of factual moral evaluations, in their historical actuality and development, must therefore be content to record this fact alongside other facts." (The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 3.xv)

"Cassirer trusts religious far more than scientific enlightenment as a counter-force to the violence of political myths—he relies on the confinement of myth within its own proper sphere, which was long ago achieved by monotheism."(Jürgen Habermas, The Liberating Power of Symbols p.26)

If we, the enlightened, are to prevail, we cannot shut ourselves up within the closed circle of reason. The formulas of science and economics are not enough. We must learn the language of unreason, the better to master and subdue it. (p.158)

Ritual denunciations of the "genetic fallacy" will convince only those who have already lost faith in tradition as a source of norms. (p.159)

【第七章　生の哲学】

Symbolism is not a dark glass separating us from reality as it is "in itself"; it is the medium within which any possible reality appears. There is, then, no conceivable extrasymbolic reality in contrast to which it can be denigrated as "artificial." Culture is not a garment thrown over the bareness of nature; it is our nature. The mask is the face, the face the mask. (pp.162-163)

[For Bergson, i]f we want the object itself, in all its concrete glory, we must do away with concepts and adopt the standpoint of pure intuition. This is the method of metaphysics, a science that—in a phrase pinpointing Cassirer's disagreement with Lebensphilosophie—"claims to dispense with symbols." (Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics p.24) (p.166)

【第八章　ハイデガー】

Through the efforts of Scheler and and others, motifs from Bergson, Dilthey, and Nietzsche were translated into the rigorously "presuppositionless" idiom of Husserl—a process paralleling the transformation of positivism into logical positivism. Thus was born that strange monster: a rigorous irrationalism, a system against systems. This monster came to maturity in Heidegger's masterpiece, Being and Time. (pp.195-196)

Heidegger's philosophy—and this is of course a serious worry—contains nothing to rule out a fascist interpretation. But neither should it simply be identified with fascism or with any other political stance. Philosophical theories are not just sublimated ideologies; they have a dynamic of their own, cutting across ideological boundaries. (p.197)

The truth of a philosophical proposition is not dependent on its political implications. Whoever has philosophy at heart must treat its problems on their own terms, dealing as best he can, through irony, esotericism, or simple silence, with any unpalatable consequences. What he cannot do is change his metaphysics to suit his politics. I am therefore skeptical of recent attempts to revise the verdict of Davos in line with current political sensibilities. Many scholars, especially in Germany, regard Cassirer's rout and subsequent neglect as an injustice, a national disgrace, for which amends must now be made. "The question remains pertinent, indeed overdue," writes Enno Rudolph, "why so constructive and rigorous an anti-nihilistic critique of European modernity as that developed by Cassirer had to lose out, in German philosophy since Heidegger, to the destructive type of anti-modernism." Cassirer lost out not just in Germany, though, but all over Europe, and for reasons that are not just political but authentically philosophical. As we have seen, his vision of philosophy as the critique of culture gave way to the aprioristic conceptions of Wittgenstein and Husserl—a shift whose ultimate explanation lies in the First World War and the accompanying loss of faith in history. Lost faith is not easily recovered. We cannot just "go back" to Cassirer; we cannot pretend that the twentieth century didn't happen. (pp.218-219)

Analytic philosophy has withstood the influence of Heidegger, but only by transforming itself into a purely technical discipline, indifferent to questions of culture and politics. Russell was a free-thinking progressivist, Frege an anti-Semitic reactionary, yet they could converse with perfect amicability on the subject of symbolic logic. Whether this marks the advent of philosophy as "rigorous science" or its final descent into triviality is another question. Our contemporary situation is, then, a torn one. We are inheritors of two histories—the one political, in which liberalism triumphed over its fascist and communist rivals, the other philosophical, in which it lost out to the Existenzphilosophie of Heidegger and the technicism of the analytic tradition. Cassirer's liberalism was all of a piece; it was at once political, cultural, and philosophical. Such unity of vision is impossible for us. Our political principles find no support in our cultural tastes, religious beliefs, or metaphysical insights. We pay tribute to Cassirer, but Heidegger remains the secret master of our thought. (p.219)

【第九章　政治】

Cassirer's appeal lies in his promise to ground political liberalism in a broader vision of human culture. He epitomizes that attitude of mind—dispassionate, ironic, and optimistic—without which liberalism in the narrow [legal or economic] sense cannot hope to survive. (p.222)

Contemporary liberals are faced, whether they like it or not, with the unpromising task of erecting a philosophy of political hope on a foundation of cultural despair. (p.222)

His criticism of Rousseau is at the same time a criticism of the so-called German concept of freedom through the state. His own preference is for the Anglo-Saxon liberal conception of freedom from the state. Yet he avoids the utilitarianism usually associated with this conception, appealing instead to the idealist notions of "humanity" and "personality." Cassirer has, one might say, married a negative conception of political freedom to a positive conception of spiritual freedom. This union is not original; its prototype can be found in Leibniz, Kant, and Humboldt. But in an era when liberalism of any kind was viewed as an excrescence of the English commercial spirit, as a "philosophy of life from which German youth now turns with nausea, with wrath, with quite peculiar scorn," Cassirer's reminder of a distinctively German form of liberalism was apt and timely. (p.229)

We have inherited liberal political institutions from our past, but not the surrounding climate of ideas that once nourished them. Gone are the certainties of the Christian era; gone, too, the cultural optimism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Our predecessors believed that political liberty would lead not only to greater material prosperity but also to the spread of knowledge, the weakening of prejudice, and the flowering of the arts. Who would dare to assert that now? (p.236)

Under these conditions, liberalism has become a purely official creed, publicly upheld rather than deeply felt, the province of lawyers and academic specialists. Economists can explain the role of law in stimulating growth, but not the point of growth itself. Political philosophers elaborate theories of justice, yet have nothing to say about their historical or metaphysical foundations. The expansive vision of Humboldt, Tocqueville, and Acton has hardened into a set of peremptory legal claims, advanced in shrill, dogmatic tones or at the point of a gun. No wonder we look back with nostalgia to a liberal such as Cassirer, whose interests were not confined solely, or even principally, to politics but spanned the breadth of human civilization. His was a humane and happy dream, and even if it was only a dream, it casts a reproachful shadow on our present age. (pp.236-237)

【メモ】 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty

ページ番号はDefinitive Edition (2011)のもの。

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【序論】

We must show that liberty is not merely one particular value but that it is the source and condition of most moral values. (p.52)

【第二章　自由文明の創造力】

We know little of the particular facts to which the whole of social activity continuously adjusts itself in order to provide what we have learned to expect. We know even less of the forces which bring about this adjustment by appropriately co-ordinating individual activity. And our attitude, when we discover how little we know of what makes us- co-operate, is, on the whole, one of resentment rather than of wonder or curiosity. Much of our occasional impetuous desire to smash the whole entangling machinery of civilization is due to this inability of man to understand what he is doing. (p.76)

The successful combination of knowledge and aptitude is not selected by common deliberation, by people seeking a solution to their problems through a joint effort; it is the product of individuals imitating those who have been more successful and from their being guided by signs or symbols, such as prices offered for their products or expressions of moral or aesthetic esteem for their having observed standards of conduct - in short, of their using the results of the experiences of others. (pp.79-80)

We have now reached the point at which the main contention of this chapter will be readily intelligible. It is that the case for individual freedom rests chiefly on the recognition of the inevitable ignorance of all of us concerning a great many of the factors on which the achievement of our ends and welfare depends. If there were omniscient men, if we could know not only all that affects the attainment of our present wishes but also our future wants and desires, there would be little case for liberty. And, in turn, liberty of the individual would, of course, make complete foresight impossible. Liberty is essential in order to leave room for the unforeseeable and unpredictable; we want it because we have learned to expect from it the opportunity of realizing many of our aims. It is because every individual knows so little and, in particular, because we rarely know which of us knows best that we trust the independent and competitive efforts of many to induce the emergence of what we shall want when we see it. (p.80)

All we can do is to increase the chance that some special constellation of individual endowment and circumstance will result in the shaping of some new tool or the improvement of an old one, and to improve the prospect that such innovations will become rapidly known to those who can take advantage of them. (p.81)

Certainty we cannot achieve in human affairs, and it is for this reason that, to make the best use of what knowledge we have, we must adhere to rules which experience has shown to serve best on the whole, though we do not know what will be the consequences of obeying them in the particular instance. (p.82)

It is not because we like to be able to do particular things, not because we regard any particular freedom as essential to our happiness, that we have a claim to freedom. The instinct that makes us revolt against any physical restraint, though a helpful ally, is not always a safe guide for justifying or delimiting freedom. What is important is not what freedom I personally would like to exercise but what freedom some person may need in order to do things beneficial to society. This freedom we can assure to the unknown person only by giving it to all. (p.84)

Because we are more aware that our advances in the intellectual sphere often spring from the unforeseen and undesigned, we tend to overstress the importance of freedom in this field and to ignore the importance of the freedom of doing things. But the freedom of research and belief and the freedom of speech and discussion, the importance of which is widely understood, are significant only in the last stage of the process in which new truths are discovered. To extol the value of intellectual liberty at the expense of the value of the liberty of doing things would be like treating the crowning part of an edifice as the whole. (p.85)

It has become a common practice to disparage freedom of action by calling it "economic liberty." But the concept of freedom of action is much wider than that of economic liberty, which it includes; and, what is more important, it is very questionable whether there are any actions which can be called merely "economic" and whether any restrictions on liberty can be confined to what are called merely "economic" aspects. Economic considerations are merely those by which we reconcile and adjust our different purposes, none of which, in the last resort, are economic (excepting those of the miser or the man for whom making money has become an end in itself). (p.87)

All that we can know is that the ultimate decision about what is good or bad will be made not by individual human wisdom but by the decline of the groups that have adhered to the "wrong" beliefs. (p.88)

【第三章　進歩のコモン・センス】

After abandoning hunting life, most of our direct ancestors, at the beginning of neolithic culture, took to agriculture and soon to urban life perhaps less than three thousand years or one hundred generations ago. It is not surprising that in some respects man's biological equipment has not kept pace with that rapid change, that the adaptation of his non-rational part has lagged somewhat, and that many of his instincts and emotions are still more adapted to the life of a hunter than to life in civilization. If many features of our civilization seem to us unnatural, artificial, or unhealthy, this must have been man's experience ever since he first took to town life, which is virtually since civilization began. All the familiar complaints against industrialism, capitalism, or overrefinement are largely protests against a new way of life that man took up a short while ago after more than half a million years' existence as a wandering hunter, and that created problems still unsolved by him. (pp.92-93)

If it were still possible to change an established usage, it would be desirable to confine the word "progress" to such deliberate advance toward a chosen goal and to speak only of the "evolution of civilization." (p.94 n4)

Even the poorest today owe their relative material well-being to the results of past inequality. (p.98)

【第四章　自由・理性・伝統】

We must always work inside a framework of both values and institutions which is not of our own making. In particular, we can never synthetically construct a new body of moral rules or make our obedience of the known rules dependent on our comprehension of the implications of this obedience in a given instance. (pp.124-125)

That we ought not to believe anything which has been shown to be false does not mean that we ought to believe only what has been demonstrated to be true. (p.125)

For in each particular instance it will be possible to promise concrete and tangible advantages as the result of a curtailment of freedom, while the benefits sacrificed will in their nature always be unknown and uncertain. If freedom were not treated as the supreme principle, the fact that the promises which a free society has to offer can always be only chances and not certainties, only opportunities and not definite gifts to particular individuals, would inevitably prove a fatal weakness and lead to its slow erosion. (p.130)

Reason undoubtedly is man's most precious possession. Our argument is intended to show merely that it is not all-powerful and that the belief that it can become its own master and control its own development may yet destroy it. What we have attempted is a defense of reason against its abuse by those who do not understand the conditions of its effective functioning and continuous growth. It is an appeal to men to see that we must use our reason intelligently and that, in order to do so, we must preserve that indispensable matrix of the uncontrolled and non-rational which is the only environment wherein reason can grow and operate effectively. (pp.130-131)

【第五章　責任と自由】

Though it [a free society] can offer to the individual only chances and though the outcome of his efforts will depend on innumerable accidents, it forcefully directs his attention to those circumstances that he can control as if they were the only ones that mattered. Since the individual is to be given the opportunity to make use of circumstances that may be known only to him and since, as a rule, nobody else can know whether he has made the best use of them or not, the presumption is that the outcome of his actions is determined by them, unless the contrary is quite obvious. (p.133)

We still call a man's decision "free," though by the conditions we have created he is led to do what we want him to do, because these conditions do not uniquely determine his actions but merely make it more likely that anyone in his position will do what we approve. We try to "influence" but do not determine what he will do. What we often mean in this connection, as in many others, when we call his action "free," is simply that we do not know what has determined it, and not that it has not been determined by something. (p.138 n8)

Of the effect in the particular instance we may never be sure, but we believe that, in general, the knowledge that he [a man] will be held responsible will influence a person's conduct in a desirable direction. In this sense the assigning of responsibility does not involve the assertion of a fact. It is rather of the nature of a convention intended to make people observe certain rules. (p.138)

Though we leave people to decide for .themselves because they are, as a rule, in the best position to know the circumstances surrounding their action, we are also concerned that conditions should permit them to use their knowledge to the best effect. If we allow men freedom because we presume them to be reasonable beings, we also must make it worth their while to act as reasonable beings by letting them bear the consequences of their decisions. (p.139)

The assigning of responsibility thus presupposes the capacity on men's part for rational action, and it aims at making them act more rationally than they would otherwise. It presupposes a certain minimum capacity in them for learning and foresight, for being guided by a knowledge of the consequences of their action. It is no objection to argue that reason in fact plays only a small part in determining human action, since the aim is to make that little go as far as possible. Rationality, in this connection, can mean no more than some degree of coherence and consistency in a person's action, some lasting influence of knowledge or insight which, once acquired, will affect his action at a later date and in different circumstances. (p.139)

The assigning of responsibility is based, not on what we know to be true in the particular case, but on what we believe will be the probable effects of encouraging people to behave rationally and considerately. It is a device that society has developed to cope with our inability to look into other people's minds and, without resorting to coercion, to introduce order into our lives. (p.140)

As everybody's property in effect is nobody's property, so everybody's responsibility is nobody's responsibility. (p.146)

Much as we may regret the disappearance of those close communities of interest and their replacement by a wide-flung net of limited, impersonal, and temporary ties, we cannot expect the sense of responsibility for the known and familiar to be replaced by a similar feeling about the remote and the theoretically known. While we can feel genuine concern for the fate of our familiar neighbors and usually will know how to help when help is needed, we cannot feel in the same way about the thousands or millions of unfortunates whom we know to exist in the world but whose individual circumstances we do not know. However moved we may be by accounts of their misery, we cannot make the abstract knowledge of the numbers of suffering people guide our everyday action. If what we do is to be useful and effective, our objectives must be limited, adapted to the capacities of our mind and our compassions. To be constantly reminded of our "social" responsibilities to all the needy or unfortunate in our community, in our country, or in the world, must have the effect of attenuating our feelings until the distinctions between those responsibilities which call for our action and those which do not disappear. In order to be effective, then, responsibility must be so confined as to enable the individual to rely on his own concrete knowledge in deciding on the importance of the different tasks, to apply his moral principles to circumstances he knows, and to help to mitigate evils voluntarily. (p.147)

【第六章　平等・価値・メリット】

Wherever there is a legitimate need for government action and we have to choose between different methods of satisfying such a need, those that incidentally also reduce inequality may well be preferable. If, for example, in the law of intestate succession one kind of provision will be more conducive to equality than another, this may be a strong argument in its favor. It is a different matter, however, if it is demanded that, in order to produce substantive equality, we should abandon the basic postulate of a free society, namely, the limitation of all coercion by equal law. Against this we shall hold that economic inequality is not one of the evils which justify our resorting to discriminatory coercion or privilege as a remedy. (p.151)

When we inquire into the justification of these demands, we find that they rest on the discontent that the success of some people often produces in those that are less successful, or, to put it bluntly, on envy. The modern tendency to gratify this passion and to disguise it in the respectable garment of social justice is developing into a serious threat to freedom. Recently an attempt was made to base these demands on the argument that it ought to be the aim of politics to remove all sources of discontent. This would, of course, necessarily mean that it is the responsibility of government to see that nobody is healthier or possesses a happier temperament, a better-suited spouse or more prospering children, than anybody else. If really all unfulfilled desires have a claim on the community, individual responsibility is at an end. However human, envy is certainly not one of the sources of discontent that a free society can eliminate. It is probably one of the essential conditions for the preservation of such a society that we do not countenance envy, not sanction its demands by camouflaging it as social justice, but treat it, in the words of John Stuart Mill, as "the most anti-social and evil of all passions." (pp.155-156)

If the remuneration did not correspond to the value that the product of a man's efforts has for his fellows, he would have no basis for deciding whether the pursuit of a given object is worth the effort and risk. He would necessarily have to be told what to do, and some other person's estimate of what was the best use of his capacities would have to determine both his duties and his remuneration. (pp.159-160)

The prizes that a free society offers for the result serve to tell those who strive for them how much effort they are worth. However, the same prizes will go to all those who produce the same result, regardless of effort. (p.160)

【第七章　多数決】

Liberalism is a doctrine about what the law ought to be, democracy a doctrine about the manner of determining what will be the law. Liberalism regards it as desirable that only what the majority accepts should in fact be law, but it does not believe that this is therefore necessarily good law. Its aim, indeed, is to persuade the majority to observe certain principles. It accepts majority rule as a method of deciding, but not as an authority for what the decision ought to be. To the doctrinaire democrat the fact that the majority wants something is sufficient ground for regarding it as good; for him the will of the majority determines not only what is law but what is good law. (p.167)

There are three chief arguments by which democracy can be justified, each of which may be regarded as conclusive. The first is that, whenever it is necessary that one of several conflicting opinions should prevail and when one would have to be made to prevail by force if need be, it is less wasteful to determine which has the stronger support by counting numbers than by fighting. Democracy is the only method of peaceful change that man has yet discovered. The second argument, which historically has been the most important and which is still very important, though we can no longer be sure that it is always valid, is that democracy is an important safeguard of individual liberty. ... The third argument rests on the effect which the existence of democratic institutions will have on the general level of understanding of public affairs. This seems to me the most powerful. (pp.172-174)

There is some truth in the view that democracy is government by discussion, but this refers only to the last stage of the process by which the merits of alternative views and desires are tested. Though discussion is essential, it is not the main process by which people learn. Their views and desires are formed by individuals acting according to their own designs; and they profit from what others have learned in their individual experience. Unless some people know more than the rest and are in a better position to convince the rest, there would be little progress in opinion. It is because we normally do not know who knows best that we leave the decision to a process which we do not control. But it is always from a minority acting in ways different from what the majority would prescribe that the majority in the end learns to do better. (p.176)

They [the resolutions of a majority] are bound, if anything, to be inferior to the decisions that the most intelligent members of the group will make after listening to all opinions: they will be the result of less careful thought and will generally represent a compromise that will not fully satisfy anybody. This will be even more true of the cumulative result emanating from the successive decisions of shifting majorities variously composed: the result will be the expression not of a coherent conception but of different and often conflicting motives and aims. (p.176)

Moreover, majority decisions are peculiarly liable, if not guided by accepted common principles, to produce over-all results that nobody wanted. It often happens that a majority is forced by its own decisions to further actions that were neither contemplated nor desired. (p.177)

"The lesson given to mankind by every age, and always disregarded - that speculative philosophy, which to the superficial appears a thing so remote from the business of life and the outward interest of men, is in reality the thing on earth which most influences them, and in the long run overbears any influences save those it must itself obey." (John Stuart Mill, "Bentham" in Collected Works, vol. 10, p.77)

If politics is the art of the possible, political philosophy is the art of making politically possible the seemingly impossible. (pp.180-181)

Only a complete misapprehension of the process by which opinion progresses would lead one to argue that in the sphere of opinion he ought to submit to majority views. To treat existing majority opinion as the standard for what majority opinion ought to be would make the whole process circular and stationary. There is, in fact, never so much reason for the political philosopher to suspect himself of failing in his task as when he finds that his opinions are very popular. (p.181)

"Students of social science must fear popular approval: evil is with them when all men speak well of them. If there is any set of opinions by the advocacy of which a newspaper can increase its sale, then the student, who wishes to leave the world in general and his country in particular better than it would be if he had not been born, is bound to dwell on the limitations and defects and errors, if any, in that set of opinions: and never to advocate them unconditionally even in an ad hoc discussion. It is almost impossible for a student to be a true patriot and to have the reputation of being one in his own time." (Alfred Marshall, "In Memoriam: Alfred Marshall" in Memorials of Alfred Marshall p.89)

The old liberal is in fact a much better friend of democracy than the dogmatic democrat, for he is concerned with preserving the conditions that make democracy workable. It is not "antidemocratic" to try to persuade the majority that there are limits beyond which its action ceases to be beneficial and that it should observe principles which are not of its own deliberate making. If it is to survive, democracy must recognize that it is not the fountainhead of justice and that it needs to acknowledge a conception of justice which does not necessarily manifest itself in the popular view on every particular issue. The danger is that we mistake a means of securing justice for justice itself. (p.183)

【第八章　雇用と独立】

The selection through inheritance from parents (...) has at least the advantage (even if we do not take into account the probability of inherited ability) that those who are given the special opportunity will usually have been educated for it and will have grown up in an environment in which the material benefits of wealth have become familiar and, because they are taken for granted, have ceased to be the main source of satisfaction. The grosser pleasures in which the newly rich often indulge have usually no attraction for those who have inherited wealth. If there is any validity in the contention that the process of social ascent should sometimes extend through several generations, and if we admit that some people should not have to devote most of their energies to earning a living but should have the time and means to devote themselves to whatever purpose they choose, then we cannot deny that inheritance is probably the best means of selection known to us. (p.192)

It is only natural that the development of the art of living and of the non-materialistic values should have profited most from the activities of those who had no material worries. (p.196)

【第九章　強制と国家】

Coercion thus is bad because it prevents a person from using his mental powers to the full and consequently from making the greatest contribution that he is capable of to the community. Though the coerced will still do the best he can do for himself at any given moment, the only comprehensive design that his actions fit into is that of another mind. (pp.200-201)

Even if the threat of starvation to me and perhaps to my family impels me to accept a distasteful job at a very low wage, even if I am "at the mercy" of the only man willing to employ me, I am not coerced by him or anybody else. So long as the act that has placed me in my predicament is not aimed at making me do or not do specific things, so long as the intent of the act that harms me is not to make me serve another person's ends, its effect on my freedom is not different from that of any natural calamity - a fire or a flood that destroys my house or an accident that harms my health. (p.204)

Provided that I know beforehand that if I place myself in a particular position, I shall be coerced and provided that I can avoid putting myself in such a position, I need never be coerced. At least insofar as the rules providing for coercion are not aimed at me personally but are so framed as to apply equally to all people in similar circumstances, they are no different from any of the natural obstacles that affect my plans. In that they tell me what will happen if I do this or that, the laws of the state have the same significance for me as the laws of nature; and I can use my knowledge of the laws of the state to achieve my own aims as I use my knowledge of the laws of nature. (p.210)

In particular, the pleasure or pain that may be caused by the knowledge of other people's actions should never be regarded as a legitimate cause for coercion. The enforcement of religious conformity, for instance, was a legitimate object of government when people believed in the collective responsibility of the community toward some deity and it was thought that the sins of any member would be visited upon all. But where private practices cannot affect anybody but the voluntary adult actors, the mere dislike of what is being done by others, or even the knowledge that others harm themselves by what they do, provides no legitimate ground for coercion. (p.212)

Generally speaking, this means that the morality of action within the private sphere is not a proper object for coercive control by the state. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics that distinguish a free from an unfree society is indeed that, in matters of conduct that do not directly affect the protected sphere of others, the rules which are in fact observed by most are of a voluntary character and not enforced by coercion. Recent experience with totalitarian regimes has emphasized the importance of the principle "never [to] identi fy the cause of moral values with that of the State." It is indeed probable that more harm and misery have been caused by men determined to use coercion to stamp out a moral evil than by men intent on doing evil. (p.213)

【第十章　法・命令・秩序】

"The law serves morality, not in that it fulfills her commands, but rather in that it secures the free development of the moral power as it resides in each individual will. The existence of law, however, is independent of that of morality inasmuch as it is not a contradiction when, in any specific case, the immoral implementations of an existing law is claimed." (Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, vol.1, pp.331-332)

Though he [the African Bantu who is required to follow the rigorously prescribed lines when he moves between the fourteen huts of his village, depending on his age, sex, and status] is not obeying another man's will but impersonal custom, having to observe a ritual to reach a certain point restricts his choice of method more than is necessary to secure equal freedom to others. (pp.219-220)

The "compulsion of custom" becomes an obstacle only when the customary way of doing things is no longer the only way that the individual knows and when he can think of other ways of achieving a desirable object. It was largely with the growth of individual intelligence and the tendency to break away from the habitual manner of action that it became necessary to state explicitly or reformulate the rules and gradually to reduce the positive prescriptions to the essentially negative confinement to a range of actions that will not interfere with the similarly recognized spheres of others. (p.220)

In most instances, therefore, nobody knows or has ever known all the reasons and considerations that have led to a rule being given a particular form. We must thus often endeavor to discover the functions that a rule actually serves. If we do not know the rationale of a particular rule, as is often the case, we must try to understand what its general function or purpose is to be if we are to improve upon it by deliberate legislation. (pp.225-226)

It is true enough that the justification of any particular rule of law must be its usefulness - even though this usefulness may not be demonstrable by rational argument but known only because the rule has in practice proved itself more convenient than any other. But, generally speaking, only the rule as a whole must be so justified, not its every application. The idea that each conflict, in law or in morals, should be so decided as would seem most expedient to somebody who could comprehend all the consequences of that decision involves the denial of the necessity of any rules. (p.228)

【第十二章　アメリカの貢献 : 立憲制】

Because of the restricted capacity of our minds, our immediate purposes will always loom large, and we will tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to them. In individual as in social conduct we can therefore approach a measure of rationality or consistency in making particular decisions only by submitting to general principles, irrespective of momentary needs. Legislation can no more dispense with guidance by principles than any other human activity if it is to take account of effects in the aggregate. (pp.266-267)

Like the forces governing the individual mind, the forces making for social order are a multilevel affair; and even constitutions are based on, or presuppose, an underlying agreement on more fundamental principles - principles which may never have been explicitly expressed, yet which make possible and precede the consent and the written fundamental laws. We must not believe that, because we have learned to make laws deliberately, all laws must be deliberately made by some human agency. Rather, a group of men can form a society capable of making laws because
they already share common beliefs which make discussion and persuasion possible and to which the articulated rules must conform in order to be accepted as legitimate. (pp.268-269)

It is inevitable that, by accepting general principles, they [the people] will tie their hands as far as particular issues are concerned. For only by refraining from measures which they would not wish to be used on themselves can the members of a majority forestall the adoption of such measures when they are in a minority. A commitment to long-term principles, in fact, gives the people more control over the general nature of the political order than they would possess if its character were to be determined solely by successive decisions of particular issues. (p.269)

【第十三章　自由と行政府 : 法治国家】

The extent to which under an established system of case law the judge actually creates law may not be greater than under a system of codified law. But the explicit recognition that jurisdiction as well as legislation is the source of law, though in accord with the evolutionary theory underlying the British tradition, tends to obscure the distinction between the creation and the application of law. And it is a question whether the much praised flexibility of the common law, which has been favorable to the evolution of the rule of law so long as that was the accepted political ideal, may not also mean less resistance to the tendencies undermining it, once that vigilance which is needed to keep liberty alive disappears. (p.298)

【第十四章　個人的自由の保護】 

The rule of law is therefore not a rule of the law, but a rule concerning what the law ought to be, a meta-legal doctrine or a political ideal. It will be effective only in so far as the legislator feels bound by it. In a democracy this means that it will not prevail unless it forms part of the moral tradition of the community, a common ideal shared and unquestioningly accepted by the majority. (p.311)

【第十五章　経済政策と法の支配】

We shall see that the observation of the rule of law is a necessary, but not yet a sufficient, condition for the satisfactory working of a free economy. But the important point is that all coercive action of government must be unambiguously determined by a permanent legal framework which enables the individual to plan with a degree of confidence and which reduces human uncertainty as much as possible. (pp.331-332)

A free system can adapt itself to almost any set of data, almost any general prohibition or regulation, so long as the adjusting mechanism itself is kept functioning. And it is mainly changes in prices that bring about the necessary adjustments. This means that, for it to function properly, it is not sufficient that the rules of law under which it operates be general rules, but their content must be such that the market will work tolerably well. The case for a free system is not that any system will work satisfactorily where coercion is confined by general rules, but that under it such rules can be given a form that will enable it to work. If there is to be an efficient adjustment of the different activities in the market, certain minimum requirements must be met; the more important of these are, as we have seen, the prevention of violence and fraud, the protection of property and the enforcement of contracts, and the recognition of equal rights of all individuals to produce in whatever quantities and sell at whatever prices they choose. Even when these basic conditions have been satisfied, the efficiency of the system will still depend on the particular content of the rules. But if they are not satisfied, government will have to achieve by direct orders what individual decisions guided by price movements will. (pp.337-338) 

How well the market will function depends on the character of the particular rules. The decision to rely on voluntary contracts as the main instrument for organizing the relations between individuals does not determine what the specific content of the law of contract ought to be; and the recognition of the right of private property does not determine what exactly should be the content of this right in order that the market mechanism will work as effectively and beneficially as possible. Though the principle of private property raises comparatively few problems so far as movable things are concerned, it does raise exceedingly difficult ones where property in land is concerned. The effect which the use of any one piece of land often has on neighboring land clearly makes it undesirable to give the owner unlimited power to use or abuse his property as he likes. (p.338)

【第十七章　社会主義の衰退と福祉国家の台頭】

It is often those who are most anxious to use our existing knowledge and powers to the full that do most to impair the future growth of knowledge by the methods they use. The controlled single-channel development toward which impatience and administrative convenience have frequently inclined the reformer and which, especially in the field of social insurance, has become characteristic of the modern welfare state may well become the chief obstacle to future improvement. (p.377)


Satisfactory solutions to these problems [problems which arise from international relations] will probably not be found as long as we have to accept as the ultimate units of international order the historically given entities known as sovereign nations. (p.379)

[U]ntil the protection of individual freedom is much more firmly secured than it is now, the creation of a world state probably would be a greater danger to the future of civilization than even war. (p.380)

I have become increasingly skeptical, however, about the beneficial character of any discretionary action of government against particular monopolies, and I am seriously alarmed at the arbitrary nature of all policy aimed at limiting the size of individual enterprises. And when policy creates a state of affairs in which, as is true of some enterprises in the United States, large firms are afraid to compete by lowering prices because this may expose them to antitrust action, it becomes an absurdity. (p.382)

It has been the experience of all countries that discretionary powers in the treatment of monopoly are soon used to distinguish between "good" and "bad" monopolies and that authority soon becomes more concerned with protecting the supposedly good than with preventing the bad. I doubt whether there arc any "good" monopolies that deserve protection. But there will always be inevitable monopolies whose transitory and temporary character is often turned into a permanent one by the solicitude of government. (p.383)

【第十八章　労働組合と雇用】

[W]orkers can raise real wages above the level that would prevail on a free market only by limiting the supply, that is, by withholding part of labor. The interest of those who will get employment at the higher wage will therefore always be opposed to the interest of those who, in consequence, will find employment only in the less highly paid jobs or who will not be employed at all. (p.389)

As a general rule, wage fixing (whether by unions or by authority) will make wages higher than they would otherwise be only if they are also higher than the wage at which all willing workers can be employed. (p.389)

[S]trictly voluntary unions, because their wage policy would not be in the interest of all workers, could not long receive the support of all. Unions that had no power to coerce outsiders would thus not be strong enough to force up wages above the level at which all seeking work could be employed, that is, the level that would establish itself in a truly free market for labor in general. (p.389)

It is important to note that such policies [of violence that some unions find expedient to use] can be employed successfully only in relatively prosperous and highly paid occupations and that they will therefore result in the exploitation of the relatively poor by the better-off. Even though within the scope of any one union its actions may tend to reduce differences in remuneration, there can be little doubt that, so far as relative wages in major industries and trades are concerned, unions today are largely responsible for an inequality which has no function and is entirely the result of privilege. (p.390)

It is, in fact, more than likely that, in countries where unions are very strong, the general level of real wages is lower than it would otherwise be ... If many still accept as an obvious and undeniable fact that the general wage level has risen as fast as it has done because of the efforts of the unions, they do so in spite of these unambiguous conclusions of theoretical analysis - and in spite of empirical evidence to the contrary. (p.390)
 
"The world we now live in is one in which the monetary system has become relatively elastic, so that it can accommodate itself to changes in wages, rather than the other way about. Instead of actual wages having to adjust themselves to an equilibrium level, monetary policy adjusts the equilibrium level of money wages so as to make it conform to the actual level. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that instead of being on a Gold Standard, we are on a Labour Standard." (John Hicks, "Economic Foundations of Wage Policy")

【第十九章　社会保障】

Though all insurance involves a pooling of risks, private competitive insurance can never effect a deliberate transfer of income from one previously designated group of people to another. (p.408)

It may seem harsh, but it is probably in the interest of all that under a free system those with full earning capacity should often be rapidly cured of a temporary and not dangerous disablement at the expense of some neglect of the aged and mortally ill. Where systems of state medicine operate, we generally find that those who could be promptly restored to full activity have to wait for long periods because all the hospital facilities are taken up by people who will never again contribute to the needs of the rest. (p.423)

【第二十章　課税と再分配】

This effect on incentive, in the usual sense of the term, though important and frequently stressed, is by no means the most harmful effect of progressive taxation. Even here the objection is not so much that people may, as a result, not work as hard as they otherwise would, as it is that the change in the net remunerations for different activities will often divert their energies to activities where they are less useful than they might be. The fact that with progressive taxation the net remuneration for any service will vary with the time rate at which the earning accrues thus becomes a source not only of injustice but also of a misdirection of resources. (p.444)

The most serious consequence, however, of the discouragement of individual capital formation where there are temporary opportunities for large profits is the restriction of competition. The system [progressive taxation] tends generally to favor corporate as against individual saving and particularly to strengthen the position of the established corporations against newcomers. It thus assists to create quasi-monopolistic situations. Because taxes today absorb the greater part of the newcomer's "excessive" profits, he cannot, as has been well said, "accumulate capital; he cannot expand his own business; he will never become big business and a match for the vested interests. The old firms do not need to fear his competition: they are sheltered by the tax collector. They may with impunity indulge in routine, they may defy the wishes of the public and become conservative. It is true, the income tax prevents them, too, from accumulating new capital. But what is more important for them is that it prevents the dangerous newcomer from accumulating any capital. They are virtually privileged by the tax system. In this sense progressive taxation checks economic progress and makes for rigidity." (p.447)

In the last resort, the problem of progressive taxation is, of course, an ethical problem, and in a democracy the real problem is whether the support that the principle now receives would continue if the people fully understood how it operates. It is probable that the practice is based on ideas which most people would not approve if they were stated abstractly. (p.449)

【第二十三章　農業と天然資源】

However strong a case there may exist in such countries [underdeveloped countries] for the government's taking the initiative in providing examples and spending freely on spreading knowledge and education, it seems to me that the case against over-all planning and direction of all economic activity is even stronger there than in more advanced countries. I say this on both economic and cultural grounds. Only free growth is likely to enable such countries to develop a viable civilization of their own, capable of making a distinct contribution to the needs of mankind. (p.491)

【第二十四章　教育と研究】

Though the specialized research institution may be the most efficient for all tasks that are of an "applied" character, such institutional research is always in some measure directed research, the aim of which is determined by the specialized equipment, the particular team assembled, and the concrete purpose to which the institution is dedicated. But in "fundamental" research on the outskirts of knowledge there are often no fixed subjects or fields, and the decisive advances will frequently be due to the disregard of the conventional division of disciplines. (p.511)

If in this book we have been concerned mainly with freedom in other fields [fields other than intellectual freedom], it is because we so often forget today that intellectual freedom rests on a much wider foundation of freedom and cannot exist without it. But the ultimate aim of freedom is the enlargement of those capacities in which man surpasses his ancestors and to which each generation must endeavor to add its share - its share in the growth of knowledge and the gradual advance of moral and aesthetic beliefs, where no superior must be allowed to enforce one set of views of what is righ t or good and where only further experience can decide what should prevail. (p.515)

【追論　なぜ私は保守主義者でないか】

Since it [conservatism] distrusts both abstract theories and general principles, it neither understands those spontaneous forces on which a policy of freedom relies nor possesses a basis for formulating principles of policy. ... A commitment to principles presupposes an understanding of the general forces by which the efforts of society are co-ordinated, but it is such a theory of society and especially of the economic mechanism that conservatism conspicuously lacks. (pp.522-523)

To live and work successfully with others requires more than faithfulness to one's concrete aims. It requires an intellectual commitment to a type of order in which, even on issues which to one are fundamental, others are allowed to pursue different ends. (p.524)

Personally, I find that the most objectionable feature of the conservative attitude is its propensity to reject well-substantiated new knowledge because it dislikes some of the consequences which seem to follow from it - or, to put it bluntly, its obscurantism. I will not deny that scientists as much as others are given to fads and fashions and that we have much reason to be cautious in accepting the conclusions that they draw from their latest theories. But the reasons for our reluctance must themselves be rational and must be kept separate from our regret that the new theories upset our cherished beliefs. I can have little-patience with those who oppose, for instance, the theory of evolution or what are called "mechanistic" explanations of the phenomena of life simply because of certain moral consequences which at first seem to follow from these theories, and still less with those who regard it as irreverent or impious to ask certain questions at all. By refusing to face the facts, the conservative only weakens his own position. Frequently the conclusions which rationalist presumption draws from new scientific insights do not at all follow from them. But only by actively taking part in the elaboration of the consequences of new discoveries do we learn whether or not they fit into our world picture and, if so, how. Should our moral beliefs really prove to be dependent on factual assumptions shown to be incorrect, it would be hardly moral to defend them by refusing to acknowledge facts. (p.526)

What distinguishes the liberal from the conservative here [concerning religious belief] is that, however profound his own spiritual beliefs, he will never regard himself as entitled to impose them on others and that for him the spiritual and the temporal are different spheres which ought not to be confused. (p.528)

【メモ】 Chandran Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism

Since the primary concern of this study is to evaluate Hayek's enterprise, and so to assess his contribution to modern political theory, and liberal theory in particular, its focus is on precisely the question of the coherence of the philosophical assumptions which underlie Hayek's attempt to offer a justification of the liberal social order. The conclusion it reaches is that Hayek's attempt fails because the philosophical assumptions which underpin his social theory are inconsistent with those underlying his attempt to justify liberal principles. It tries to show, first, how Hayek's view of the nature of human knowledge and his account of the nature of social order lead him to develop arguments for liberalism grounded in a profoundly anti-rationalist stance; and secondly, how his desire to secure this defence in a set of normative principles upholding individual freedom lead him to adopt, at the same time, a more rationalist approach to the problem of justifying his liberal theory of justice. (p.17)

Kant's reasoning appears to be circular. He argues that we must think of ourselves free because we are born under moral laws and then claims that we must be under moral laws because we think of ourselves as free. Kant himself notes this in the Groundwork (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals p.111). While he does attempt to answer this objection here, his remarks in the Critique of Practical Reason are more illuminating. There he argues that freedom is the necessary condition of the moral law's existence, but the moral law is the only condition under which freedom can be known. Freedom would exist regardless of our awareness of the moral law; but only because we do know the moral law are we aware of our freedom. Freedom is thus the ratio essendi of the moral law, but the moral law is the ration cognescendi of freedom (Critique of Practical Reason p.4n). (p.33)

Justice is therefore the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom (The Metaphysical Elements of Justice p.34)

In so far as [Kant] thinks that justice, like morality, is not to be justified by material and subjective ends, his [theory of justice] is a deontological theory. Yet in so far as his legal and moral theory are founded on a theory of objective ends, it appears to be teleological. The objective end Kant presents is that condition in which each individual's freedom is in harmony with the freedom of all others. And the reason he gives for seeing this as an objective end is that the only (ultimate) end of creation or existence is man, who is the only being whose causality is teleological or directed to ends, and who is yet unconditioned by nature because he is free (Critique of Teleological Judgement p.99). Indeed man is distinguished by his freedom to choose his own ends or purposes, and for this reason the condition which offers the greatest scope to human self-legislated ends is the objective end that should be sought. This is the real end of nature: to attain that condition in which human ends can flourish. (p.38)

If [Hume and Kant's] theories do in fact stand in irreconcilable conflict, as separate defences of the liberal philosophy, Hayek's restatement of liberalism would have either to embrace one and reject the other, or risk presenting an account of liberalism which rests on inconsistent premises. It is the latter course that Hayek chooses, for he sees no fundamental incompatibility between the views of Hume and Kant as far as their social philosophies are concerned. (p.44)

Hayek's critique of constructivist rationalism, and his account of the evolution of rules of conduct in the theory of spontaneous order, are strikingly Humean in character. His political philosophy is, to a considerable extent, founded in Humean assumptions about the nature of society and the place of justice within it. He sees morality as a social institution composed of rules of conduct which have evolved with the social order and have derived their legitimacy, ultimately, from the fact that they facilitate the co-ordination of human activities and enhance society's prospects of survival. He thus follows Hume in regarding justice as an institution which enables man to cope with his circumstances, and denying  that the rules of justice can be discovered by reason. At the same time, however, Hayek appears to reject the idea of such a 'conservative' justification of the liberal order. In attempting to uncover the principles of a liberal order he turns to a Kantian emphasis on the importance of freedom as the master principle of the Great Society. His conception of freedom as 'independence of the arbitrary will of another' is indeed strikingly Kantian, emphasizing as it does that liberty means 'the absence of a particular obstacle - coercion by other men' (The Constitution of Liberty p.19). (p.45)

[Unlike Kant, for Hayek] [t]here are no fixed categories of understanding but only constantly adjusting mechanisms of perception; man's capacity to know is developing as much as his knowledge is growing. (p.50)

Hayek differs from Kant in another important way. He does not draw a distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality' or ask if or how we can know 'things in themselves' (The Sensory Order pp.4-5). (p.50)

One important aspect of his epistemology, however, is particularly Kantian: his account of knowledge as rule-governed. In 'The Primacy of the Abstract' he describes the mind according to 'the system of abstract rules which govern its operation (New Studies p.43) (...) While Kant presents a metaphysical, rather than a physiological account of the rule-guided nature of knowledge, his views closely resemble, and illuminate, Hayek's theory. In the first Critique Kant characterizes the faculty of understanding as a 'faculty of rules' which is always 'investigating appearances, in order to detect some rule in them' (A p.126). More than this, rules are necessary if we are to 'know', for these rules enable us to organize experience: 'without such rules appearances would never yield knowledge of an object corresponding to them' (A p.159, B p.198). Kant's concept of the understanding is much like Hayek's conception of the mind as a system of abstract rules, applied when an object or 'appearance' is encountered, so that these objects may be 'classified' or 'known'. (pp.51-52)

Our rules for establishing true coherences - as against illusory ones - are and must remain indeterminate. Any rules we have must be applied, of course: and, to do this, we may have additional rules for their application. But we cannot go on having specific rules for the application of specific rules for the application of specific rules ad infinitum. At some point we must have "rules" of application (if we can call them that) which we cannot specify, because we must simply dwell in them in a subsidiary way. They are part of our deepest commitments. But for this reason they are not specifiable. (Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning p.61)

That erroneous view [constructivist rationalism] is closely connected with the equally false conception of the human mind as an entity standing outside the cosmos of nature and society, rather than being itself the product of the same process of evolution to which the institutions of society are due. (Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol.1 p.5)

Having concluded in the Sensory Order, and in his essays on the philosophy of mind, that the individual was incapable of distancing himself from the cosmos of nature so as to account fully for its operation, Hayek maintains that it is similarly impossible for man to distance himself sufficiently from the cosmos of society to construct a complete account of its structure. Such an account, he argues, would involve an attempt to produce a complete explanation of how society and its institutions have evolved and will evolve, by people who, at the same time, do not know how they themselves are evolving as the members of those institutions, or know how their explanations may affect the development of those institutions. (p.60)

While rules may thus be defended on the basis of their past and current effectiveness or compatibility with social life or with the community's 'sense of justice', they cannot be defended on the basis of a future end-state which comprises the 'total consequences' of those rules (LLL Vol.2 p.19). (p.65)

From Hayek's anti-constructivist perspective, however, Rawls's enterprise appears misconceived. What Rawls is trying to do is to articulate what cannot be articulated. The assumptions made in this attempt are not only implausible but, in fact, presume the absence of problems whose solution is the product (rather than the pre-condition) of justice. (p.69)

The background of unarticulated rules can never be captured to form the first premiss of a syllogism defining justice. It is not that argument about justice and equity is not possible; rather, the idea of criticizing the justice of the social structure as a whole from the perspective a putative sense of justice elicted from that social structure is mistaken. (p.71)

Institutions of justice do not reflect a shared conception of justice. Rather, they reflect man's epistemological predicament: he is able neither to articulate fully his understanding of right and wrong nor to know enough about his world to be certain about his (and others') judgements. Institutions make up for this lack because they embody rules of conduct which have been tested by experience. What individuals do share (to varying extents) is confidence in the appropriateness of the institutions serving this function. (p.71)

The kind of philosophical undertaking Hayek denies is not that which questions the values implicit in social practices but that which seeks at one and the same time to question all social values (New Studies p.19). Implicit in this attitude is the assumption that the task of political philosphy can never be completed, for criticism will always have a place in society in which values change. That there is no single 'reasonable and workable conception of justice' which philosophers can identify or construct does not thus signify the practical irrelevance of social theory but, rather, explains why it will always be a vital part of polity. (p.73)

It is not enough merely to say that the parties in [Rawls's] OP [=Original Position] know all the relevant and true beliefs concerning human nature and social theory; what is needed if we are to know how we would judge from that perspective is not just the assumption that we know: we need that true social theory before us. Rawls does not offer us any such theory. Indeed he cannot; for it is not possible to present a social theory which is not, to some extent, influenced by the interests and assumptions of the theorist. (p.75)

Any construction of a point of view from which to outline [individual] entitlements would represent not a view of persons in society but the view of the single individual involved in that construction. (p.77)

On this basis Hayek suggests that rules of justice cannot be constructed in the abstract but must be the outcome of the social process. Although the activity of theorizing a part of that process, it is no more than that: a part of the process. There can be no blueprints produced by political theory, and all evaluation of the rules and social processes that dominate society must begin by acknowledging the existing tradition within which all social and moral discourse takes place. (pp.79-80)

The contradiction into which Hayek seems to be locked is one in which he is forced to claim that there can be no social theory that can guide our evaluation of the entire structure of our institutions, while conceding that a considerable social theory, explaining the purpose served by our institutions, is necessary for us to evaluate and alter our rules of conduct. (...) This is an important problem. It makes it hard, if not impossible, for Hayek to make any positive claims about the good society: about the principles which govern its operation or how we might move towards it. His anti-constructivist epistemology suggests that we can never comprehend the workings of society well enough to know what kind of rules would best sustain it. (pp.82-83)

By order we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct. (LLL Vol.1 p.35)

The point is that, while it is easy to protect a particular person or group against the loss which might be caused by an unforseen change, by preventing people from taking notice of the change after it has occurred, this merely shifts the loss onto other shoulders but does not prevent it. (Individualism and Economic Order p.21n)

Herein lies the chief merit of the liberal concern for, and emphasis upon, procedural or formal justice rather than the justice of substantive outcomes, for a concern for procedural justice does not mean indifference to, or unwillingness to consider, the nature of the good for man. The concern for procedures betrays a recognition that it is largely because of the rules of justice, which seek to preserve the freedom to pursue the good, that the good can be discovered. (p.118)

Law in its ideal form might be described as a "once-and-for-all" command that is directed to unknown people and that is abstracted from all particular circumstances of time and place and refers only to such conditions as may occur anywhere and at any time. (...) [A]s we move from commands to laws, the source of the decision on what particular action is to be taken shifts progressively from the issuer of the command or law to the acting person. (The Constitution of Liberty p. 218)

In such an effort towards the development of a body of rules, most of which are accepted by the members of society, there will therefore also exist an 'objective' (in the sense of being inter-personally valid, but not of universal [validity] — because it will be valid only for those other members of the society who accept most of its other rules) test of what is unjust. (LLL Vol.2 p.42)

The mind cannot step outside itself to view its own operation. Since the mind, as he [Hayek] conceives it, is a system of rules embedded in a social structure also constituted by rules of conduct, it is similarly impossible for the mind to step outside society and view its operations from beyond. The difficulty of separating mind from society tells against the possibility of the mind comprehending the operation of the whole. (p.180)

This is, perhaps, the main significance of Hayek's Road to Serfdom - not the cogency of his doctrine, but the fact that it is a doctrine. A plan to resist all planning may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to the same style of politics. And only in a society already deeply infected with Rationalism will the conversion of the traditional resources of resistance to the tyranny of Rationalism into a self-conscious ideology be considered a strengthening of those resources. (Michael Oakeshott, 'Rationalism in Politics' p.21)

What remains disturbingly unclear in all this, however, is the relationship between the conservative elements in Hayek, which deny the power of reason successfully to reconstruct human institutions and reject the possibility of rationally justifying them, and the more rationalist Hayek who regards traditions in a more instrumental manner. (p.189)

[In contrast to utilitarianism] His [Hayek's] defence of the liberal order is based not on the claim that its rules will produce end-states we would choose if we knew what alternatives were available, but on the contention that the rules of the liberal order enable us to adapt to a changing environment which is always creating states of affairs which we can never wholly anticipate, let alone choose. (p.197)

【メモ】 矢嶋直規、『ヒュームの一般的観点 : 人間に固有の自然と道徳』

【序章　人間に固有の自然と道徳】

ヒュームは、道徳規範は人間が物質的環境において行動様式を内面化するのと同一の仕方で習得されると考える。これは通常「適応」と理解されている状況である。こうした過程を経ることによって、人間は自然を、人間にとって馴染みのあるもの、その意味での自然として捉えかえし、外的な力としての自然に直接支配されることを避けることができる。知覚に基づく認識の対象となる以前の自然は、それ自体では人間にとって横暴な力である。しかし自然は、一般的な知覚の対象とされることによって私たちにとって自然であると感じられ、より容易に対処できる対象となる。それが人間の身体的な自由な活動を可能にする条件となり、そこに道徳的自由の基礎も存する。ヒュームは人間を自然の一部でありながら、自然の認識を人間に固有のものへと転換する存在として論じている。こうした存在の仕方が人間に固有の自然と考えられる。(p.7)

感覚の印象を論じながら、ヒュームは人間が自然の原理に従って物体の信念を持ち、世界を秩序だったものとして認識する過程を解明する。人間の生を構成する物質的環境との相互作用に際し、苦を避け、快を求める過程を経て、人はその最も原初的な意味での快苦の原理という自然の法則に従う行動様式を習得する。このことが、人が他者と交流する社会的環境で、道徳という手段に従って苦を避け、快を求める行動をとる仕方を習得することにつながる。人間による物質的環境の認識は、同時に物質的対象に対する振る舞い方の習得である。こうした根本的な仕方で自然は、私たちの行動の規範を与える。人間に固有の自然は一つであり、人間は物質的環境を認識するときにも、社会的環境を認識するときにも、同じ自然の能力と原理に従うと考えられる。それゆえ道徳とは、私たちが自然的環境とのかかわりから習得する振る舞いの仕方をモデルとして、他者と安定した関係を維持するための規範と理解することができる。この意味で、道徳の規範は理性によって概念的に獲得されるのではなく、自然によって経験的に与えられるものと考えられる。(pp.16-17)

しばしばヒュームの理論は道徳的知覚の生成を描写するが正当化を含まないとされることがある。確かにヒュームの因果論は私たちの因果信念が合理的に正当化できないことを示すものと言える。しかし、合理的正当化が人間の行動に関する唯一の正当化ではないとすれば、そうしたヒューム批判は必ずしも的確ではない。ヒュームの道徳哲学は、適切な道徳のあり方を解明することに向けられている。端的に言うならば、ヒュームが適切と考える道徳の正当性の根拠は、それが習慣の原理として妥当し社会の安定を実現することに求められている。(pp.17-18)

正義を経験的概念とすることによって、ヒュームは正義についての非経験的権威を排除しようとした。正義は人々の一般的行動を規制し、それによって社会に秩序をもたらす因果作用である。因果律としての正義は人間の自然としての慣習に由来するがゆえに、人間に一般的に適用されうる。(pp.20-21)

因果律の信念は、対象の個別的性質を厳密に知覚することなく、対象の一般的性質に基づいて行動するという人間の行動の仕方をもたらすことになる。因果律の本質は必然性の心理的感覚に存するがゆえに、人間はその必然性の感覚に従って行為せざるをえない。こうして人々は外的もしくは物理的な強制力に突き動かされる前に自ら規範的信念に服従するに至る。これが知覚と信念に基づく規範的行動の説明である。状況は常に個別的であるが、私たちはその個別性に一般性を見出すという仕方でしか状況を認識できないし、与えられた状況認識に基づいてしか行動することができない。因果論を、規範的行動に結びつく対象の信念として理解することで初めて、ヒューム哲学における因果論の道徳的意義が正しく理解される。(pp.25-26)

普遍的な道徳規範は存在しない。しかしそれは個人の道徳的決定のための規範が存在しないということではない。現在の秩序を形成している規範が、感覚を通して知られ、直面する事態への反応のあり方を定める。道徳性の本質は、 個人の主体的決断にではなく、また国家、理性、神の指令にでもなく、個人の生存を可能にしている自然的な共同体を成立させる秩序に存する。そしてこの経験的事実が、その規範が引き続いて秩序の形成と維持の基礎として妥当することの根拠となる。 (pp.31-32)

【第二章　空間・時間論の意義】

my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations. For besides that this belongs not to my present purpose, I am afraid, that such an enterprise is beyond the reach of human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses. As to those who attempt any thing farther, I cannot approve of their ambition, till I see, in some one instance at least, that they have met with success. But at present I content myself with knowing perfectly the manner in which objects affect my senses, and their connections with each other, as far as experience informs me of them. This suffices for the conduct of life; and this also suffices for my philosophy, which pretends only to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions, or impressions and ideas. (A Treatise of Human Nature 1.2.5.26)

The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form. (ibid. 1.2.6.4)

デカルトが物質と精神が別の原理に基づくとしたことは、物質的世界の認識と道徳的世界の認識が分断されることを意味した。ヒュームはこの事態を克服すべく、人間に固有の自然をデカルトによって分断された物質と精神を繋ぐ共通媒体と位置づけたのだと考えられる。空間・時間によって成立する世界が実は私たちの知覚の秩序に他ならないならば、その領域で展開する物体の運動もまた、知覚の秩序を根拠にすることが帰結するであろう。こうして、空間・時間論に基づいて因果関係を、さらにその因果関係を安定させる外的物体を、人間にとっての自然の現象として論じることが可能になる。……こうしてヒュームはデカルトにおいて実体とされる物体の延長を、知覚の秩序へと転換し、デカルトの二元論を経験論の立場から再統合した。(p.100)

 【第三章　因果論と規範の生成】

信念と単なる虚構との根本的な違いは、信念が一般性のある行動のよりどころとなる点にある。……虚構と信念とは意味論的には区別されないが、信念は虚構とは異なり、単なる意味論的な了解を超えた一般化可能な実践的関与を可能にする。この点にヒュームの因果論と信念論との本質的なつながりがある。(pp.115-116)

信念は印象と観念の中間に位置し両者の長所を兼ね備えている。信念は感覚の直接性と観念の非現実性のバランスを取る働きとして理解されている。ヒュームによれば、私たちが現実につながりながら、しかし現実に逐一振り回されることなく「平安と平静」を保つことができるのは、信念の働きのためなのである。こうした信念の説明が、第一章で論じた個別性と一般性の結合としての「一般観念」の説明に対応することは注目に値する。このことは、信念が一般的観点から見られた個別的観念であることを意味している。(p.118)

理性と感性の関係について、 理性による判断はその主体に固有のものであるが、しかし「感じ」は個人に固有のものではなく、人間に固有の自然、言い換えれば公共的な知覚に基づくとヒュームは考える。(p.132)

As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and it will always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the author of our being. Nor is such a question any way material to our present purpose. We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses. (Treatise 1.3.5.2)

ロックと異なり、ヒュームはそうした概念［物自体という真の原因の概念］を道徳の領域の説明に持ち込むことも拒んでいる。原因結果という現象の理解の仕方そのものが私たちの経験の産物であり、それを私たちにとっての現象と、そうした現象を可能にする現象以外のものとの関係の理解のために用いるのは不適当と見なされるからである。したがって、ヒュームにおいて「知ることができない原因としての力能」を想定するニュー・ヒューミアンは、ヒュームの知識論の基本的な枠組みを壊して、ヒュームの人間の科学に別の要素を持ち込むことになる。知ることのできない原因の想定はヒュームを疑似二元論者とするであろう。(p.141)

しかし、因果的実在論の傾聴すべき主張を、ヒュームの因果論についての端的な懐疑主義的解釈の不十分さを指摘している点に認めることができる。(p.142)

［エドワード］クレイグやニュー・ヒューミアンたちが指摘しているように、確かにヒュームはしばしば因果律の実在を想定しているかのように論じることがある。この傾向は『論攷』よりも『人間知性探究』で一層顕著である。ではなぜヒュームは、彼の懐疑主義的立場にもかかわらず、因果的力能が対象に存在するかのように述べるのだろうか。その理由は、彼の理論が因果的信念の人間的な意義の解明を目指したものだからであると考えられる。因果律はそれが実在であるから妥当するのではなく、私たちがその実在性を信じるがゆえに有効なものとなるのである。……因果信念が哲学的観点からは虚構であるにもかかわらず、私たちがそれらを実在と信じるがゆえに、私たちはそれに依拠して行動し、それによって因果は真実として機能する。(pp.142-143)

【第四章　「外的物体論」の道徳哲学的意義】

Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced. (Treatise 1.2.6.8)

We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. (ibid. 1.4.2.1)

私一人にだけ現れる外的物体は存在しない。外的対象を認識するとは、個人が他者と共有可能な視点を持つことに他ならないのである。外的物体の認識は本質的に共同体的行為であり、それによってこそ一般的観点によって表されるのである。ヒュームは道徳的認識の本質をこの公共的妥当性もしくは相互の意思疎通の可能性に帰している。ここに、ヒュームの認識論と道徳論の関連があり、外的物体論にはその関連が示されていると言える。(p.180)

【第六章　一般的観点とスミスの公平な観察者】

ヒュームのシンパシーは正義の成立以前の自然の働きであるが、スミスではその正義の判定手段である。もしもシンパシーが、スミスが主張するように感情の適正性の判定手段であるならば、シンパシーの役割はあるものが正であるか不正であるかを決める理性に近いものになる。(p.228)

【第八章　正義と一般的観点】

ヒュームは、ホッブズが論じたように共同体の秩序を離れた自然状態には正義は存在しないと考える。明らかに政治社会は自然状態ではない。それゆえ、政治社会を自然状態から区別するのは人為的なものでなければならない。こうして正義は、自然な人間関係を超える人間関係の拡張としてとしての社会形成を説明する中心的概念と位置づけられる。社会形成のためには、自然な人間関係とは異なる、新しい原理が必要とされる。しかしそれは、正義が自然的原理と無関係に存在することを意味するものではない。ヒュームは人為的徳である正義を自然的原理である情念の理論に接続するものとして構想している。ホッブズの自然と社会との断絶の理論とは異なり、ヒュームの正義論はむしろその連続性を示そうとする試みである。(p.265)

ヒュームは家族集団が社会に発展することを妨げる障害が存在すると指摘する。その障害とは、自分自身や自分の家族の利益を優先しようとする利己心である。それゆえ正義はこの自然的利害に対抗する力として因果的に作用するものでなければならない。(pp.265-266)

it is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin. (Treatise 3.2.2.18)

自然の資源が限りなく存在するか、あるいは人々が他者に対して神的な仁愛を向ける本性を持っていたならば正義の必要はなかったとヒュームは指摘する。(p.268)

社会の最も原初的な単位としての家族は、人々の協力の利点を増大させるためにより大きな集団へと発展することを阻むものである。社会を形成するためには、家族の形成に働く自然的な原理とは異なった原理に従わなければならない。そのため正義は、身近な存在に関心を寄せる人間の心理的な傾向に反する効果を持つものでなければならない。(p.270)

慣習の確立は合意の上で決定された規則ではないから、しばしば主張されるようにヒュームの正義が規則に従う慣習から生じると考えることは誤りである。規則に従おうとする動機は抽象的であり、自然に成立する動機とは見なされない。人間は規則に従うのではなく、自然に従うというのがヒュームの原則である。(p.271)

ヒュームの根本的な洞察は、身体的危害などの犯罪のより根源的な原因は、所有をめぐる社会秩序の不安定にあり、所有の正義の確立が自然的徳を最も効果的に機能させることにつながるという点にある。(p.291 note 11)

ヒュームは、社会の安定の最大の脅威は、ある特定の人々の特定の行動というよりも、むしろ他者の所有を侵害しようとする人々の一般的傾向であることを明確に意識している。というのも、社会の本質はその一般性にあり、人々の一般的傾向が無秩序に向かうならば社会の崩壊は不可避だからである。ヒュームは社会の存続を危うくするのは、支配者の直接の横暴ではなく、人々一般の規範の崩壊であると考えている。逆に言うならば、圧政は人々の規範を維持できなくさせることによって社会を崩壊させるのである。(p.273)

ホッブズとヒュームの違いは所有の安定を達成する仕方にある。ホッブズでは、合理的観点から人々は相互の信約により突然に自然権を放棄し、主権者への絶対的服従を選択するとされるが、ヒュームでは、歴史的過程において人々は社会に先立って放棄すべき「権利」を所有せず、知覚と情念の自然な進行が生み出した秩序を自覚的な仕方でより確実に確保することから権利が生じるとされている。(pp.274-275)

ヒュームはしばしば保守主義者として批判されるが、彼は同時代の因習の最も過激な批判者であった。ヒュームが同時代の所有体系を固定させることを主張したと理解することは誤りである。ヒュームの所有論はあくまでも、正義と社会の観念がいかにして所有に基づいて形成されるかを説明することであった。社会秩序が慣習に基づくという主張と、どのような慣習でも絶対的に固定すべきであるという主張とは、まったく内容の異なる主張である。(p.292 note 20)

I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt us, though without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are performed upon the supposition, that something is to be performed on the other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, though they have never given promises to each other. (Treatise 3.2.2.10)

権利は一般の人々がある事物やその人の行為を含む事柄を、ある人に占有させることの一般的承認として成立する。……権利と義務は一つの事態をめぐる二つの視点を代表する。ある個人の権利とは、それ以外のすべての他者にとっての何らかの義務を意味する。多くの見知らぬ人々が相互に道徳的関係を取り結ぶ仕方は、他者の所有を侵害しないという消極的関与のみである。(p.284)

デーヴィッド・ミラーは「ヒュームは獲得や移転のいかなる原理が採用されるかは、それらの原理が一般に承認される限りどちらかといえば重要な事柄ではないと論じてもよかった。別の言い方をすれば、所有理論を論じつくす原理の正当性を探すのは間違いである。正当化されるのは所有の体系全体であり、その細部の規則ではない。……これらの規則（五つの獲得の規則と移転の規則）は自然に所有権の割り当てを決定しなければならない誰に対しても思い浮かぶが、それらを厳密な意味で正当化することは可能でもないし、またその必要もない」と述べている。正当化とは何かという問題は、ヒュームが論じるすべての問題に共通の課題であるが、ヒュームはそれを人間の自然の事実として提示し、規範と事実を自然において統合しているというのが本書の立場である。(p.294 note 30)

【第九章　「道徳の理由」――「狡猾な悪人」をめぐって】

「狡猾な悪人」が目論む不正な自己利益の獲得と、発覚を免れた不正行為の心理的正当化の主張とは、習慣によって形成されるそうした一般的観点を恣意的に操作することが可能であるという主張に他ならない。しかし、私たちが通常の自然的資質を有し、社会的承認を獲得しようとして振る舞う者である限り、自然的事象と道徳的事象の一般的な認識を拒むことは事実として不可能である。そのことは、道徳感覚の知覚を否定することの不可能性、つまり一般的観点を取らないことの不可能性を意味する。たとえ意識的な操作によって一時的にそれを否定しようと試みても、その操作を自己の持つ世界像の隅々にまで浸透している自然な感覚と調和させることが断じてできない。実はこれが、ヒュームによる迷信や熱狂に対する哲学的批判であり、彼ら迷信者、熱狂者たちは自分が主張していることを自分でも信じることができないのである。習慣という試金石に耐えない主張は、混乱と悲惨、もしくは滑稽を引き起こすことはあっても、秩序形成の原理となることはありえない。(pp.304-305)

ヒュームはその［事実と当為の関係について述べている］個所で事実認識と道徳認識が別々のものであると主張しているのではなく、道徳の当為と、因果論に示される自然認識の必然性の感覚が同じ人間の自然に属することに、合理主義道徳論者が気づいていないことを指摘しているのである。(p.306)

【第十章　契約と政府への忠誠】 

Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her. (Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary 2.12.24)

If the reason be asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer, because society could not otherwise subsist: And this answer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your [the social contractian's] answer is, because we should keep our word. But besides, that no body, till trained in a philosophical system, can either comprehend or relish this answer: Besides this, I say, you find yourself embarrassed, when it is asked, why we are bound to keep our word? Nor can you give any answer, but what would, immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance (ibid. 2.12.37)

所有の安定は社会をさらに発展させる原理としてはおろか、諸個人の生存を確保するための規則としても決して十分なものではない。誰も自分の生活を維持するのに必要な物資を完全に独力で確保することはできないから、人間にはその生存を維持するために社会を構成する他者との互恵的関係が必要である。社会は個体の持つ自然的弱点を克服する手段であり、正義の規則を遵守する必然性は、自ずと人間にとっての社会の必要性に伴って強くなる。また、諸個人の生活の多様な側面を安定して維持するためには、社会内部での互恵的関係あ特定の少数の人間に限定されることは不都合である。そのため社会の構成員は、その個別的特徴にかかわらず、できる限り多くの構成員と互恵的な関係を結ぶことが必要となり、そのためには各個人は同じ法によって秩序づけられた社会を構成する一般者として見なされ、また一般者として振る舞わなければならない。(p.321)

possession and property should always be stable, except when the proprietor consents to bestow them on some other person. This rule can have no ill consequence, in occasioning wars and dissentions; since the proprietor’s consent, who alone is concerned, is taken along in the alienation: And it may serve to many good purposes in adjusting property to persons. Different parts of the earth produce different commodities; and not only so, but different men both are by nature fitted for different employments, and attain to greater perfection in any one, when they confine themselves to it alone. All this requires a mutual exchange and commerce; for which reason the translation of property by consent is founded on a law of nature, as well as its stability without such a consent. (Treatise 3.2.4.1)

ヒュームが社会契約説を受け入れることができないのは、歴史的事実に反するからという以上に、社会契約論が約束についての哲学的解明に基づく理論ではないからである。(p.325)

When we consider any objects at a distance, all their minute distinctions vanish, and we always give the preference to whatever is in itself preferable, without considering its situation and circumstances. This gives rise to what in an improper sense we call reason, which is a principle, that is often contradictory to those propensities that display themselves upon the approach of the object. (...) My distance from the final determination makes all those minute differences vanish, nor am I affected by any thing, but the general and more discernible qualities of good and evil. (Treatise 3.2.7.5)

ここ［上記引用］にヒュームの「一般的観点」が示されている。(p.332)

【結語】

ヒュームが「一般的観点」を用いたとき、マルブランシュの「神において見る」や、デカルトの「精神の眼」、スピノザの「永遠の観点」などをまったく念頭に置いていなかったとは考えられない。デカルトが近代哲学を根本的に観念の理論として提唱して以来、「観点」は近代哲学の諸理論を特徴づける中心的な概念となった。デカルト、マルブランシュ、バークリ、スピノザ以外にも、ホッブズの「神の視界」、ライプニッツのモナドの「固有の視点」など、ヒュームと深いかかわりのある哲学体系も、観点の位置づけによってそれぞれの理論が根本的に特徴づけられると言っても過言ではない。このことは、「一般的観点」がヒュームの理論で実質的な意義を持つことのさらなる論拠なる。(p.350)