本書の導入論文。短いながらも素晴らしい。
Hayek is different things to different people, ranging from well-founded, though selective, characterizations to ill-founded and tiresome caricatures. Perhaps this is the fate of all genuine polymaths, easily amenable to being coopted in the service of some ideological stance or subject to the more subtle phenomenon of exclusion through disciplinary protectionism. Hayek was well aware of this twofold danger. Hayek didn’t view himself in the way the grandiose term"polymath" usually suggests but rather as a man interested in all aspects of human endeavor, none of which can easily be hived off without at some point skewing the study. (p.xiii)
<Erol Başar, "Views of Hayek, Hebb, and Heisenberg: Toward an Approach to Brain Functioning">
ポストモダン脳科学？この論文を読む限り、トンデモである（英語も滅茶苦茶。誰か校正する人いなかったのか…？）
<Joshua Rust, "Hayek, Connectionism, and Scientific Realism">
現在の認知科学、心の哲学の文脈にHayekの『感覚秩序』を位置づける。Hayekは、（一方で精神的秩序は物理的秩序の部分集合であるとしながら）物理的秩序も精神的秩序の部分集合である、という考え方にコミットしているので、科学的実在論を前提とするコネクショニズムやSearleらの議論とはそもそも問うている問いが違うのだ、という指摘は面白い。それにしてもSearleとかFodorはつまらな（ｒｙ
Hayek's operative question concerns the gap between two different kinds of mental orders: that of our ordinary classificatory system and that of the classificatory system of an idealized someone who is very much like us except with the addition of great deal of investigative experience. Hayek's gap, then, is epistemic rather than ontological. When he speaks of a potential isomorphism between mental and physical orders, this is to be understood in terms of the distance between how the world is ordinarily construed (the manifest image) and how a future scientist might come to construe it (however limited). (p.42)
<Don Ross, "Hayek's Speculative Psychology, the Neuroscience of Value Estimation, and the Basis of Normative Indivualism">
むむ…難しい。神経科学についての知識不足ゆえ満足に理解できたとは言い難い。Hayekが最後まで記述的個人主義を保持していたという前提には疑問があるが、規範的個人主義を擁護するRossのやり方は面白い。
For humans, relatively thoughtless mimesis and obedience to norms come naturally and easily; but self-creation and self-maintenance is the difficult and often traumatically challenging project that consumes much of the energy expenditure of a normal life. This is the basis of, and naturalistic justification for, normative individualism. A person's self is her most precious asset, which demands continuous investment
<Edward Feser, "Hayek, Popper, and the Causal Theory of the Mind">
本書で一番面白かった論文。感想はTwitterに載せたので繰り返さない。
We have had to assign a certain interpretation to the otherwise meaningless symbolic representations we have decided to count as the 'premises' and 'conclusion' of a given inference the machine is to carry out, and we have had to design its internal processes in such a way that there is an isomorphism between them and the patterns of reasoning studied by logicians. (p.77)
"[F]or any any causal system there is a limit to the complexity of other systems for which the former can provide the analogon of a description or explanation, and that this limit necessarily excludes the possibility of a system ever describing or explaining itself. This means that, if the human mind were a causal system, we would necessarily experience in discussing it precisely those obstacles and difficulties which we do encounter and which are often regarded as proof that the human mind is not a causal system." (F.A. Hayek, "Within Systems and About Systems" Paragraph 1)
Natural selection favors survival value, not truth or falsity. Hence, you are not going to get truth or falsity from natural selection, and neither will you get from it the concepts that thoughts and statements - the sorts of things that are susceptible of being either true or false - presuppose. (p.95)
<James R. Wible, "C.S. Peirce and F.A. Hayek on the Abstract Nature of Sensation and Cognition">
比較の題材としてPeirceとHayekを取り上げるところにはセンスを感じるが、残念ながら内容は皮相的。
"The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve, whatever it may be, constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is the physiological analogue of the major premiss." (C.S. Peirce, Studies in Logic by Members of the John Hopkins University p.422)
"Now, Mill seems to have thoughtlessly or nominalistically assumed that a fact, is the very objective history of the universe for a short time, in its objective state of existence in itself. But that is not what a fact is. A fact is an abstracted element of that." (C.S. Peirce, Reasoning and the Logic of Things p.198)
<Jan Willem Lindemans, "Hayek's Post-Positivist Empiricism: Experience Beyond Sensation">
この論文も面白かった。明示化可能な知識を可能にする明示化不可能な超越論的形式は、神経インパルスが走るために整備されていなければならないシナプス結合のネットワークなんだよね。それもまた（広い意味での）「経験」の産物であるゆえ、Hayekの哲学はKantianではなく、むしろ「HumeとともにHumeを超える」経験論であると。
Like in computers, the rules on how it [the brain] can be 'reprogrammed' are present in the brain, while the actual inputs for this reprogramming ultimately come from outside the brain... The external environment that 'does the programming' is not consciously aiming at something - although some activities, like propaganda, could be interpreted as real neural programming. (p.165 n12)
In the case of individual experience, the co-occurrence of impulses precedes the formation of a connection. However, in the case of racial experience, the 'conjecture' of a connection precedes the occurrence of any impulses. For instance, if the connection between. 'brightly colored animal' and 'poison' is innate, such an animal will never have experienced, not even in a pre-sensory manner, the simultaneous occurrence of bright colors and poison before the connection was present – nor will one of the ancestors ever have had such an experience. (p.160)
<Giandomenica Becchio, "A Note on the Influence of Mach's Psychology in The Sensory Order">
『感覚秩序』では一回もHumeが引用されていないということには気付かなかった。Hayekの認知科学はHumeよりはむしろMachの影響が強いんだね（間接的にはHumeの影響を受けていると言えるかもしれないが）。Machの『感覚の分析』を読んでみたくなった。
"[A]lthough the theory developed here was suggested in the first instance by the psychological views which Ernst Mach has outlined in his Analysis of Sensations and elsewhere, its systematic development leads to a refutation of his and similar phenomenalist philosophies: by destroying the conception of elementary and constant sensations as ultimate constituents of the world, it restores the necessity of a belief in an objective physical world which is different from that presented to us by our senses." (F.A. Hayek, The Sensory Order 8.37)
<Gloria Zúñiga y Postigo, "The Emergence of the Mind: Hayek's Account of Mental Phenomena as a Product of Spontaneous Order and Social Orders">
"While there can ... be nothing in our mind which is not the result of past linkages (even though, perhaps, acquired not by the individual but by the species) , the experience that the classification based on the past linkages does not always work, i.e., does not always lead to valid predictions, forces us to revise that classification." (F.A. Hayek, The Sensory Order 8.14)
"The task of science is thus to try and approach ever more closely towards a reproduction of this objective order - a task which it can perform only by replacing the sensory order of events by a new and different classification." (ibid., 8.28)
He [Hayek] does not conflate metaphysics with epistemology by suggesting that there is no reality beyond perception. In fact, he recognizes that perception is always an interpretation of reality (TSO 6.36). Yet, he argues that 'any attempt to reduce [the task of science] to merely a complete description of the phenomenal world' must break down because in the sensory order events are not classified in the same way as in the objective realm (TSO 8.30). Hayek seems to believe that the recognition of this distinction in classification in the subjective and objective realms is one of the main contributions of TSO [note: TSO vii]. This realist perspective, however, has been overlooked. (p.187)
<Chiara Chelini, "Hayek's Self-Organizing Mental Order and Folk-Psyochological Theories of the Mind">
本書で一番つまらなかった。「メンタライジング」はHayekの分類理論では説明できないという前提で論が進んでいくが、これはHayekの分類理論を理解していない証左。
<Chor-yung Cheung, "Beyond Complexity: Can The Sensory Order Defend the Liberal Self?">
言いたいことは分かるが、自由主義的な自我概念を無条件に価値あるものと見なすことを、Hayekならあくまで帰結主義的に認めるだろうな。少なくとも、そのような自我概念を共有していない人に対する説得力は弱いだろう。
<Thierry Aimar, "Cognitive Opening and Closing: Toward an Exploration of the Mental World of Entrepreneurship">
私の興味の範囲から若干ズレるので割愛。
<Troy Camplin, "Getting to the Hayekian Network">
どちらかというとネットワーク理論の紹介。整理されているとは言い辛いが、内容は面白い。
If everything in the universe is self-organized, where do we get this idea, resurrected by socialists, that conscious design is the norm? Humans, like most animals, evolved to immediately, instinctively recognize the signs of others of their species. With wolves, lions, and other strongly territorial species, scent signs mark territory to warn off others. But humans are more visual, so we leave visual evidence of order. As a consequence, we associate the presence of order with an orderer or designer, and the development of creationist theories to explain nature, soul theories to explain the mind, and governments to order society. Darwinism and self-organization theories replaced creationist theories (for most people); top-down soul theories, including Descartes' homunculus theory, evolved into CAS theories of the brain's network structures, out of which the mind emerges; top-down social theories (where the hierarchical structure of the Catholic church was reproduced in other Western social structures, for example) gave way to Adam Smith's bottom-up self-organizing "invisible-hand" theory. While life and mind have continued to evolve toward theories of self-organization, our social theories took a u-turn when socialism emerged as a respectable theory of economic ordering. The designer fallacy, increasingly abandoned in theories of life and mind, was readopted in our social theories. (p.260)
"Coevolving adaptive agents attempting to predict one another's behavior as well as possible may coordinate their mutual behavior through optimally complex, but persistently shifting models of one another." (Stuart Kauffman, The Origins of Order p.404)
"[W]hen an environment is stable, there is a selective pressure for learned abilities to become increasingly innate. That is because if an ability is innate, it can be deployed earlier in the lifespan of the creature, and there is less of a chance that an unlucky creature will miss out on the experiences that would have been necessary to teach it." (Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct p.244)
"In general, a range of brain circuits, defined by our genes, provide "pre-representations" or hypotheses that our brain can entertain about future developments in its environment. During brain development, learning mechanisms select which pre-representatations are best adapted to a given situation. Cultural acquisition rides on this fringe of brain plasticity. Far from being a blank slate that absorbs everything in its surroundings, our brain adapts to a given culture by minimally turning its predispositions to a different use. It is not a tabula rasa within which cultural constructions are amassed, but a very carefully structured device that manages to convert some of its parts to a new use. When we learn a new skill, we recycle some of our old primate brain circuits - insofar, of course, as those circuits can tolerate the change." (Stanislas Dehaene, Reading in the Brain p.7)
"[M]ore complex networks tend to fluctuate less and are more stable than simpler networks." (Mark Buchanan, Nexus p.146)
If we can avoid the temptation to retreat to less connected modularity, the egalitarian network will bring everyone up – so long as good rules and good institutions, decentralization, and avoiding the temptation to try to control the system reign. (p.277)
"If the loss of links pushes the network efficiency down and environmental volatility up past some critical level, the strongly homogeneous network structure will break down into a sparse, hierarchical structure, similar to a core-periphery and is accompanied with a breakdown in network efficiency." (Frank Schweitzer et al., "Economic Networks: The New Challenges" in Science, 325 (5939) p.423)
Our hypersensitivity to intention may make it difficult to persuade belief in spontaneous orders. We want to believe in creationism or intelligent design, whether in cosmology, biology, government, or economy. Yet, science helps us understand the world beyond how we are programmed to see it. (p.280)
